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CRAWFORD HOWELL TOY

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"The earliest trace of the Toy family is found in England in the person of Robert Toy, bookseller in Saint Paul's Churchyard in 1640. Members of the family came to America about 1720, and settled first in New Jersey and then in Baltimore, whence Professor Toy's grandfather moved to Virginia about the beginning of this century" [19th]. This grandfather died in 1814 leaving an infant son, Thomas Dallam Toy, 1814-1879.

Thomas Dallam's childhood was spent with his mother at Ferry's Point. At the age of fourteen his school days closed, and he was apprenticed to a druggist in Norfolk. But this was not the end of his intellectual growth. His evenings were devoted to study, and he became a man of unusual attainments and high standing in the community. He had special talent for languages, and was able to act as interpreter when foreign ships came into port. He even began the study of Hebrew, and cultivated the taste for good reading in his family. He was a member of the firm of King & Toy, wholesale and retail druggists of Norfolk. The firm did an extensive business before the Civil War, and was subsequently carried on under the name of Thomas D. Toy & Sons.

Mr. Toy was one of the constituent members of the Freemason Street Baptist Church of Norfolk, founded in 1848, its first treasurer, first Sunday School superintendent, a member of the first group of deacons, and leader of the choir. When the church edifice was built he gave liberally of his means and time, and in order to reduce the costs he cut with his own hands all the glass for the windows. He had a wide and accurate knowledge of the Scriptures, and it was his custom to read from the Bible with his family at breakfast and at supper. At noon he spent an hour in prayer and meditation. Such was the father of Crawford Howell Toy.¹

Crawford's mother, Amelia Ann Rogers, was the granddaughter of a Revolutionary officer, named Stanhope. The Stanhope family are said to have settled in Virginia about the beginning of the eighteenth century.

Crawford Howell Toy, the first of nine children, four sons and five daughters, was born at Norfolk on the 23d of March, 1836, and died in Cambridge, Mass., on the 12th of May, 1919. He came, as we have seen, of excellent stock, was inheritor of the best traditions in regard to learning, enjoyed rare opportunities for education, and was endowed with the ability and the will to make the most of these. Like his father, he was slight of figure, but not frail, as appears from his fondness for mountain climbing and from his power to endure long and arduous study.

Crawford received his elementary training at the Norfolk Academy, which at the time was organized on the military basis. He was captain of one of the companies. On his graduation he received from the school a copy of the works of Shakespeare "for excellence." In 1852, at the age of sixteen, he entered the University of Virginia,

¹ For the foregoing details I am indebted mainly to *The University of Virginia, its History, Influence, etc.*, II, 50, N. Y., 1904, and to the *History of the Freemason Street Baptist Church, Norfolk, Va.*, by Ella M. Thomas, Norfolk, 1917.

the most illustrious of educational institutions in the South. Among his teachers were such eminent men as Gessner Harrison, J. Lawrence Smith, and William B. Rogers. Besides the ordinary subjects attractive to students Mr. Toy took a course in constitutional and international law, and devoted some attention to the study of medicine. His attainments in music, which was one of his lifelong interests, led to his selection as leader of a student choir.

Graduating from the university with the degree A.M. in 1856, Toy spent the next three years in teaching English in the Albemarle Female Institute, which had recently been established at Charlottesville. It may seem strange that he did not at once proceed to special study for his professional career. He may have been in doubt what to choose, he was so young, and had so many aptitudes and interests. In 1859 was founded another school which was to have most important relations to young Toy's future. This was the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, at Greenville, South Carolina, now one of the greatest of American schools. It was the first fully equipped divinity school among southern Baptists, and was intended to provide not only for men of college training, but also for those who in the South enter the ministry in large numbers without such training. One of the requirements of all teachers is a declaration of doctrine embracing the essential tenets of the faith.

The founder and president of the Seminary was James P. Boyce (1827-1888). The most eminent scholar in the new faculty was John Albert Broadus (1827-1895), who was settled at Charlottesville during all of Toy's residence there, first as pastor of the Baptist church (1851-55) and assistant professor of Latin and Greek in the university (1851-53), then chaplain to the university (1855-57), and finally pastor again (1857-59). When Dr. Broadus was considering a call to the new institution at Greenville,

Toy was one of the signers of a protest against his acceptance, the ground being that another man might be found to supply the place at Greenville, whereas no other could fill his important position as pastor at Charlottesville. A yet stronger illustration is seen in the words of another correspondent,² who wrote to Dr. Broadus that it would be better to choose as theological professors men "who cannot hold out in preaching." "To take valuable ministers," he continues, "from prominent positions to teach twenty or thirty young men to become preachers, many of whom are made worse by it, and none benefited, . . . is too great a sacrifice. . . . Then here is a female institute, which in my humble opinion will do more good than all the theological schools in the United States."

Toy certainly did not share this extreme view, for he was one of the twenty-six students in attendance at the opening session, of whom ten were from his native state. He completed in one year about three-fourths of the entire three years' course of study. A letter from Professor Broadus, dated March 28, 1860, mentions Brother Toy's purpose to go to Japan (as missionary), and adds, "Toy is among the foremost scholars I have ever known of his years, and an uncommonly conscientious and devoted man."³ He was then just twenty-four. The decision to become a missionary may have been reached during this year at Greenville, for the Seminary has from its beginning always devoted great attention to fostering the missionary spirit. One day in each month is set apart for the meetings of the Society of Missionary Inquiry, and on this day no other exercises are held.

At Charlottesville in June, 1860, Toy and three of his friends were ordained to the ministry. The "charge"

² A. T. Robertson, *Life and Letters of John Albert Broadus*, Philadelphia, 1901. P. 148.

³ *Ibid.* P. 173.

to the young men was delivered by Professor Broadus. The first half of 1860-61 he spent at home, probably engaged in study preparatory to his missionary work. During the second half he was professor of Greek at Richmond College. On December 17, 1860, J. William Jones in a letter to Dr. Broadus says that the Board have decided not to send out any missionaries for the present, and adds: "Toy talks of going out anyway and taking the chances."⁴ The outbreak of war in 1861 interfered with the plan of becoming a missionary.

That Toy should have a part in the war was under all the circumstances inevitable. In October, 1861, he entered the Confederate service with the Norfolk Light Artillery Blues. He declined the request that he should stand for election to a captaincy, and he served first as private in artillery and later as chaplain in infantry in General Lee's army. The strenuousness of the service could not dampen the ardor of the student. There is a tradition that spare moments were given to the Arabic language. In March, 1863, a friend wrote of him: "I saw Toy ten days ago. He is chaplain in the 53d Georgia regiment Is looking very well and seems to be enjoying himself. His Syriac books are in Norfolk and he has, therefore, been compelled to fall back on German for amusement."⁵

On July 4th, 1863, he was captured at Gettysburg. The conditions at Fort McHenry, where he was imprisoned, were rigorous in the extreme. The tedium of this confinement was relieved by the glee club, the daily mock dress parade with tin pans for drums, and the class in Italian, organized and taught by him. In December he was exchanged, joined the army again, and remained in service till the middle of 1864, when, quite without expectation on his part, he was appointed professor of Natural Philosophy at the University of Alabama, at the time a military training-school of the Confederacy.

⁴ Robertson, *Life*. P. 180.

⁵ *Ibid.* P. 197.

Here he remained teaching applied mathematics till the close of the war in 1865. In the Federal cavalry raid which burned the University buildings all of his books were destroyed.

In 1865-66 he was again with his Alma Mater teaching Greek, with the title "licentiate." Two years were then spent in Berlin, where he studied theology with Dörner, Sanskrit with Weber, and Semitic with Roediger and Dieterici. Among his anecdotes from the Berlin period is one about the professor who said of the royal family, "Die Allerhöchsten sind in die Kirche gegangen, um den Höchsten anzubeten."

In January, 1869, Toy was chosen professor of Greek in Furman University at Greenville, South Carolina, and in the following May he was elected professor of Old Testament Interpretation and Oriental Languages in the Seminary where he had been a student ten years before. This position he held for ten years, two of them at Louisville, Kentucky, whither the Seminary was removed in 1877. After two years the words "Oriental Languages" were dropped from the name of the professorship, which was thus restored to its original form. During his connection with the Seminary Professor Toy was known to his colleagues, the student body, and wider circles as the most learned member of the faculty, and indeed as a man of extraordinary learning.

My acquaintance with Dr. Toy dates from the autumn of 1876, when I became a student at the Seminary, though I had been familiar with the report of his omnivorous reading and prodigious knowledge. I soon learned that the report was no exaggeration. In the class room he seemed to know everything about the subjects which he taught. He criticized the text-book with freedom, and sought not to fill the mind of the students with facts, though he never minimized the value of fact, but to stir up the mind to the exercise of its own powers.

In his course on the English Bible many a student heard views expressed which were both novel and disturbing; as when the lecturer told him that the word "day" in the first chapter of Genesis means a day of twenty-four hours, whereas we know that the world was not made in six such days but is the result of ages of evolution; or when he said that the author of the book of Daniel was not a contemporary of Nebuchadnezzar but lived in the second century B.C. These commonplaces in the teaching of today were startling to many minds in the South four decades ago. Dr. Toy never demanded that his views on any subject should be accepted without question. With transparent fairness he gave the arguments pro and con on any disputed question that came up, and stated his own preference or conviction, but preferred that the student in the presence of all the facts should form his own judgment. And it was ever his method to set the student at work gathering facts for himself, and thus acquiring at first hand the materials for reaching conclusions. While his opinions were based on careful study and were firmly held, no man was ever more ready to revise them in the light of additional knowledge. Needless to say, he exercised a profound influence on the thinking of his students.

While every utterance of Dr. Toy regarding the Scriptures was reverent and considerate, his classes became aware of a difference between him and his colleagues, and as time went on he found it increasingly difficult not to give expression to his most mature thought on Biblical questions. This leads to one of the most important episodes in his life, which is entitled to be presented with some fulness.

When Dr. Toy began his teaching in the Seminary his orthodoxy seems to have been above all ground of suspicion. The subject of his inaugural lecture in 1869 was "The Claims of Biblical Interpretation on Baptists."

Baptists, he says, must "cling close to the word of God as our sole guide. . . . A fundamental principle of our hermeneutics must be that the Bible, its real assertions being known, is in every iota of its substance absolutely and infallibly true."⁶ He certainly held no such view ten years later. What had taken place in the interval?

In the *Memoir* just cited Dr. Broadus informs us that Dr. Toy had entered on his Seminary career with the idea that it was important to harmonize Scripture references to physical phenomena with the results of physical science, and had tried various methods, but without satisfactory results. In Greenville under the influence of Darwin's work he gave a popular lecture on the origin of man. He had also become profoundly interested in the Biblical researches of Kuenen and Wellhausen. "Near the end of the first session at Louisville it became known to his colleagues that Dr. Toy was teaching views in conflict with the full inspiration and accuracy of the Old Testament writings. By inquiry of him it was learned that he had gone very far in the adoption and varied application of the evolutionary theories above indicated. Dr. Boyce was not only himself opposed, most squarely and strongly, to all such views, but he well knew that nothing of that kind could be taught in the Seminary without doing violence to its aims and objects, and giving the gravest offence to its supporters in general" (*Memoir*, p. 261). At the request of President Boyce, Dr. Broadus tried to persuade Dr. Toy to let "theoretical questions alone, and teach the students what they needed," that is, instruction in "the Old Testament history as it stands." Dr. Broadus reports that Dr. Toy promised to do this, and that he tried faithfully the next season to keep the promise. But "as the session went on, he frankly stated that he found it impossible to leave out those inquiries, or abstain from teaching the opinions he held." Dr. Toy

⁶ John A. Broadus, *Memoir of James Petigru Boyce*, New York, 1893. P. 211.

decided to lay a statement of his views before the Seminary trustees' meeting at Atlanta in May, 1879 (in connection with the annual meeting of the Southern Baptist Convention), and "in order to relieve the Board from restraints of delicacy, he tendered his resignation."⁷

The resignation was almost unanimously accepted, but "the regret at this necessity was universal and profound," because "Dr. Toy had shown himself not only a remarkable scholar and a most honorable and lovable gentleman, but also a very able and inspiring teacher, and a colleague with whom, as to all personal relations, it was delightful to be associated." Elsewhere Broadus wrote on May 10: "The mournful deed is done. . . . Toy's resignation is accepted. . . . We have lost our jewel of learning, our beloved and noble brother, the pride of the Seminary."⁸ As evidence of the high character of all concerned in this painful affair, it may be stated that the personal relations continued to be warm and friendly to the end of life. Dr. Toy accepted the decision without

⁷ It seems not unlikely that the episode of the Sunday School Times had something to do with Dr. Toy's resignation. Though not mentioned by Dr. Broadus, this episode must have made him and Dr. Boyce anxious lest the Seminary should become involved in suspicion of heterodoxy, a suspicion which, for a variety of reasons, they would be loth to have it bear. In the light of subsequent events it is now evident that this anxiety was not without foundation. But to the incident itself: In the first half of 1878 and 1879 the Sunday School lessons were based on selected portions of the Old Testament, and Dr. Toy furnished weekly to the Sunday School Times an article under the title "Critical Notes." In 1879 the lessons published in the issues of April 12 and 19 were based on Isaiah 42 1-10 and 53 1-12. In the first of these passages Dr. Toy held that "servant" of verse 1 means, as elsewhere in the book, Israel. In regard to Isaiah 53 he held that the subject is still the same. "The reference is throughout to Israel immediately, with a final complete fulfilment in the Messiah." The Christian Intelligencer, an organ of the Reformed Church in America, scented danger in these articles, and on April 24, denounced Dr. Toy and the Sunday School Times in unmeasured terms. The Sunday School Times in an editorial on May 10, for the benefit of those of its readers "who may have been misled by the hasty and erroneous statements of the Christian Intelligencer," shows that Dr. Toy's interpretation of Isaiah 53 is not heretical but is held by other reputable Biblical scholars. Dr. Toy's last "Critical Note" was in the issue of May 24. For two or three weeks after that date the critical articles appear with no name attached. The selections then passed from the Old Testament to the New.

⁸ Robertson, Life. P. 313.

reproaches or bitterness, supported by the consciousness of rectitude, and by that catholic, philosophic spirit which never failed him in any crisis.

When it became known that the resignation had been accepted by the trustees, some of the delegates to the Convention, former students of Dr. Toy, urged him to lay the matter before the Convention, assuring him of their cordial support. But he politely declined to enter into any controversy. Referring to this incident, one of the members of that Convention has recently written of Dr. Toy as follows: "The spirit of Dr. Toy was always pacific. In him was more light than heat. He relied upon the sweet reasonableness of his statements of belief, and disdained the arts of the rhetorician or the debater. Not a word of unkindness did he speak of his adversaries, who sometimes, swayed by the *odium theologicum*, forgot the amenities of discussion. Dr. Toy was central peace at the heart of universal agitation. Nothing disturbed his splendid poise. Calmly he faced withdrawal from the tenderest associations and friendships of his life, sustained by the strength of his trust in God. He went out like Abraham, not knowing whither he went, but assured of divine leadership."

In the letter of resignation (published in the *Religious Herald*, Richmond, Va., Dec. 11, 1879) Dr. Toy affirms his unequivocal acceptance of the Seminary doctrine, that the Scriptures were given by inspiration. But as to the method, he says, we must examine the writings themselves. We may hold to no *a priori* theory. In science, in history, in prophecy, there are obvious errors in the Scripture. These, however, concern the shell, not the kernel, of religious truth. The Bible is wholly divine and wholly human. The Biblical writers received divine truth into their souls, which they then expressed in a natural, human way. Dr. Toy considers this view not only lawful to teach in the Seminary but "one that will

bring aid and firm standing ground to many a perplexed mind, and establish the truth of God on a firm foundation."

For a couple of years after the resignation there was not a little excitement throughout the South. Dr. Toy was the theme of much discussion in the denominational press. The *Religious Herald* published at least eight editorials on the subject of Inspiration. Dr. Toy contributed to this paper and to the *Baptist Courier* of South Carolina several articles in elucidation of the views expressed in his letter of resignation. Needless to say, these were all objective, expressed with the calm and confidence of one who knows.

Dr. Toy's work at the Seminary was not limited to his formal teaching. I have noted that it was his delight to guide his students to independent reading and research. He led them likewise into charming and instructive by-ways, as in a course of lectures on the fine arts, among which he included dancing. In commenting some days later on the death of John the Baptist, Dr. Broadus remarked to his class, "See what the dance of a silly girl led to." One of the students interrupted the speaker with, "But, Dr. Broadus, Dr. Toy told us the other day that dancing is a fine art." The lecturer replied, "Brother Toy may, but I don't."

From the Seminary period date several elaborate contributions to the *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, on Hebrew and on Yoruban philology. The translation and enlargement of the Lange commentary on Samuel (in collaboration with Dr. Broadus) likewise belongs to this period.

Dr. Toy was for three years my favorite teacher in the Seminary, and I had intended remaining a fourth year for study with him. The summer following his resignation, and as a result of it, I went to Germany to continue there the pursuit of those studies which I had begun with him. Through letters he continued his kindly office of

guide and adviser. I am venturing to quote from some of these letters because they show his mind on a variety of topics, and make several references to the Seminary experience and to the doctrine of the Inspiration of the Scriptures.

First from a letter written before my going abroad:

"With a critical knowledge of Hebrew and Greek, ability to read German and French fluently, and habits of scientific investigation, you can doubtless work out theology for yourself. In so far as theology is the statement of Biblical teaching, it is absolutely dependent on exegesis, and in so far as it leaves exegesis, it depends on other sciences. . . . We may be sure that no harm will come from upholding truth, and I am quite sure that the O. T. hermeneutical principles that I have taught are true, and will make their way" (Norfolk, June 14, 1879).

To learn German he advises to keep aloof from those who speak English and to associate as much as possible with Germans. Dash

"boldly at talk, careless of mistakes and inadequacies; timidity in talking is the great obstacle to learning a strange language." Regarding music: "If possible, get instruction in music, the principles of harmony and the practice of vocalization; and after a while get a short history of music, learn the names and lives of composers and the character of their works and the history of the development of the science." When he wrote, he had been about two weeks in New York. "I have no official engagements, but shall do such work as offers itself in the line of Shemitic languages and Biblical exegesis. I have not yet got under way, and cannot say that I have any definite plan, but something will no doubt work itself out" (New York, October 18, 1879).

"Franz Delitzsch is ultra conservative, and his spirit and method are not good. He is afraid of the Bible and afraid of science. Some of his commentary work . . . is excellent. But when he gets into theology or, what is worse, pseudo religious philosophy (as the psychology of the Bible) that bizarre, resultless jumble of religion and science, he is weak and misleading. . . . At present I am living very quietly, writing an occasional article for a newspaper, and doing a little work for the *Independent* of this city. Some of the younger men of the South are pushing their inquiries into the Inspiration of

the Scriptures. There is . . . a spirit of inquiry among our people. The trouble is that they have not the necessary knowledge of the facts, and the knowledge cannot be acquired except by steady and long-continued work" (New York, Feb. 23, 1880).

"This question of Inspiration is a broad and deep one, and it will do you no harm to ponder it quietly for some time, before you commit yourself definitely and go into the heat of the conflict. And, about the conflict itself. I am unfriendly to controversy, as it is usually carried on. Though a man may be honest and true, it puts him into a frame of mind unfavorable to the pursuit of pure truth. My advice to you is to keep out of it, if possible — to be categorical or dogmatic rather than controversial. When you get back to America, there will be plenty of opportunity to speak out, and it may require determination and skill, and above all, quiet conviction, intellectual and spiritual repose, to keep out of sharp controversy. But I would take the liberty to urge two things on you: first, do not put yourself into a position where you will be gagged — that will destroy your mental symmetry and your satisfaction in life; prefer to starve rather than take a place where you must stifle or conceal your honest convictions; and then, in announcing and enforcing your opinions, choose the method of positive, categorical exhibition, such a method as you would use with a child to whom you wished to explain. Of course this may not always be possible, but it will in nine cases out of ten. Have your scheme well worked out, and expound it in the spirit of a philosopher, a lover of truth, without attacking other people's opinions. The surest way of destroying error is to teach truth, and that is the only way to reach the people, who as a rule don't understand arguments. Teach after the manner of the Sermon on the Mount. . . . I suppose I shall be in this city for several months to come. I am still writing for the *Independent* newspaper, and have other matters in hand. At a recent meeting of the Oriental Society in Boston, I read a short paper on Noun-inflection in Sabeian (Himyaritic), and I shall probably read something at the meeting of the American Philological Association at Philadelphia next July" (New York, May 29, 1880).

Before the next letter Dr. Toy had accepted a call to Harvard University as Hancock Professor of Hebrew and other Oriental Languages and Dexter Lecturer on Biblical Literature. Referring to this position he wrote from Cambridge, September 30, 1880, "I begin work tomorrow

under fairly favorable circumstances." In the same letter he says of an article by Rev. Dr. Bartlett, which had been submitted to me as a test of my own views, "I don't wonder that you couldn't subscribe to Bartlett's views; they not only defy exegesis, but muzzle thought."

In connection with Dr. Toy's election to Harvard, Dr. Broadus wrote "a most cordial recommendation, with the explanation that Dr. Toy's leaving the Seminary was due to nothing whatever but his holding views like those of Kuenen and Wellhausen."⁹ Writing from New Jersey to me on August 3, 1880, Dr. Broadus says, "I hope to see Toy before the week closes. You know he has been appointed Professor of Hebrew and other Shemitic Languages at Harvard. I had the great satisfaction of laying myself out on a letter to the appointers. I am persuaded he will do great things there for Shemitic Philology." Dr. Toy held the Lectureship till 1903, and the Professorship till 1909, when he became Professor Emeritus. After his resignation he continued the work of research with his wonted enthusiasm, and produced one of his most noteworthy books.

When Dr. Toy came to Harvard, a Semitic Department did not exist. Of Semitic languages only Hebrew was offered. In his first year he added Aramaic, and gave a course of "evening readings" on the Arabic Poets. The next year he gave similar readings on the Book of Job. The addition of a new member to the Department in 1882 made a division of labor and an increase of the Semitic offerings possible. There followed a succession of assistants, and, for longer or shorter periods, of other instructors, with the result that for many years Harvard has offered elementary and advanced instruction in all the leading Semitic tongues, and courses on the history, literature, and religion of the more important Semitic peoples. Dr. Toy gave instruction in Hebrew, Aramaic,

⁹ Broadus, *Memoir*. P. 264.

Arabic, Ethiopic, the Talmud, general Semitic grammar, history of Israel, religion of Israel, Old Testament introduction, quotations from the Old Testament, criticism of the Pentateuch and of Chronicles, constitution of Genesis, the Spanish califate, and the Bagdad califate. "From the nature of his material his class room attracted thoughtful and earnest students, but never considerable numbers. His instruction was characterized by fulness and accuracy of learning, orderly arrangement, comprehensiveness and lucidity of statement. His aim was always, however, less to impart knowledge than to quicken the mind of his pupils, to indicate sources and methods, to guide into the ways of research and productivity."

As lecturer Dr. Toy's utterance was measured and easy, always compact with thought, always choice in expression. He inclined to the conversational style, and encouraged the asking of questions. His manner towards students was deferential and considerate, almost paternal. He never put one of them to shame by irony or rebuke, however strong the temptation may have been. The urbanity of the well-bred gentleman never forsook him. Such considerateness he manifested indeed towards all men, especially to such as were in need. What endless hours he gave to those who submitted their manuscripts to him for criticism! How many in theological or ecclesiastical difficulty brought their troubles to him, and found relief in his sympathy and advice! It was his view that a man should not necessarily change ecclesiastical connections because of difference of opinion. He remained a member of the Baptist Church for nearly eight years after coming to Cambridge. Then he withdrew and joined the Unitarian Church. But he was never an ecclesiastical partisan in the old relation or the new. Nor was he an iconoclast. For this his temper was too judicial, and he was able to see a subject in too many of its bearings.

On coming to Harvard Dr. Toy's great learning was promptly recognized by his colleagues. Perhaps it is no exaggeration to say that they regarded him as the most widely informed member of the Faculty. His acquisitiveness for languages was insatiable. It led him to take up Sanskrit, which he taught to one of his Greenville associates, Persian, Assyrian, Egyptian, and Russian. He was profoundly versed in literatures, ancient and modern, and found time to keep informed on the stream of works constantly issuing from the press. The only criticism I ever heard as to his knowledge came from his laundress, who once said: "Dr. Toy don't know nothing. He don't know how to sew on a button." In the use of tools and machinery he was singularly inexperienced.

Dr. Toy was the first scholar not a Unitarian to become professor in the Harvard Divinity School. His appointment was but a first step of many which have resulted in making that school the centre of a group of affiliated Seminaries, including Andover, which more than a century ago was founded as a protest against "Harvard theology." He was not only teacher but served in other capacities. He was a member of the Harvard Library Council and of the administrative board of the Graduate School. Outside the University he held office in various learned societies. He served on the editorial staff of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and as president of the American Oriental Society and the American Philological Association. But no man ever set less value on honors of this class than did he, as one may see from the meagre account of him in *Who's Who in America*. The same remark applies to the degrees received from institutions of learning — D.D. from Wake Forest College, LL.D. from Howard College, University of North Carolina, and Harvard University.

For my first six years in Cambridge it was my good fortune to live with Dr. Toy, and to have the friendship

of earlier years ripen into intimacy, which I prize among my most precious memories. In conversation his plans for work and publication were a favorite topic, and he was always interested to hear of the intellectual work of others. But regarding his experiences, achievements, honors, he was singularly uncommunicative. This reticence was due to a self-abnegating quality of soul, as beautiful as it is rare. He was regular and methodical in his daily routine, went but little into society, worked late at night, slept well, and ate well, but could go all day without food if he could but have his pipe.

Dr. Toy spent three sabbatical years abroad, the first in 1887-88. At the end of this year he was married at Norfolk, on May 24, 1888, to Nancy Saunders, daughter of Rev. Dr. Robert Milton Saunders.

Dr. Toy was the prime mover in the founding of the Conversation Club in Louisville, and at Harvard he founded three organizations for intellectual ends. The first of these is the Biblical Club. Early in 1881, not long after his arrival on the scene, he invited a small group of scholars to meet at his room in Wadsworth House, and there was formed the Harvard Semitic Club, which had for its object the study of the Old Testament in the original tongues and in the versions. Not long after, the name was changed to the Harvard Biblical Club, and the New Testament was included as an object of study. Dr. Toy was the first and only president, except in his sabbatical years abroad, when a substitute was temporarily chosen. This election year after year was in recognition of his learning and fairmindedness. The club has always included most of the Biblical teachers in the Protestant theological schools in and about Boston.

A year or two later he founded the club of graduate students and undergraduates known at first as the Semitic Seminar, then as the Semitic Seminary, and finally as the Semitic Conference. In the selection of subjects to be in-

vestigated and presented to the club, Dr. Toy was always inspiration and guide.

The Harvard Club for the Study of the History of Religions came into being in Dr. Toy's study in the autumn of 1891. This Club comprises a small group of Harvard instructors and an occasional member from the outside. Dr. Toy's chief interest during the later years of his life was the broad field of religion, and he was rarely happier than in the monthly meetings of this group of congenial friends. The Club has no elected officers, but Dr. Toy kept the record as long as he was able to attend the meetings, and by unanimous consent he was always looked up to as the president. When he completed twenty-five years of service at Harvard this Club celebrated the event by a dinner and the presentation of a handsome silver cigar case engraved with the initials of the members. In 1912, in connection with several of his friends and former pupils, the Club published in his honor a volume, *Studies in the History of Religions*, as a belated commemoration of his seventy-fifth birthday (March 23, 1911).

The space allotted to this article is already so nearly exhausted that only the briefest account of Professor Toy's publications can be given. Before coming to Harvard he published a life of Rev. Dr. R. B. C. Howell, and as we have seen, an American edition of the Lange commentary on the Books of Samuel. In 1882 appeared the *History of the Religion of Israel, an Old Testament Primer*. This is a clear and concise presentation of the leading facts from the modern point of view, with such account of the political history and of the literature as the nature of the subject required. *Quotations in the New Testament*, 1884, is intended to show how the expounders of the new religious movement deal with the sacred books of their nation, what is their method of interpretation, how they understand the instructions, exhortations, and predic-

tions of the past, how they fit the old order of things into the new. The discussion of hermeneutical principles (pp. xxi ff.) is reverent but plain-spoken. It points out that the New Testament writers, while in many respects superior to their contemporaries, were yet, in the ordinary processes of thinking, men of their times. The rabbis, though profoundly reverent, pursued "an unhistorical, unscientific mode of studying" the Scripture. Historical criticism and exegesis were sciences not yet born. A passage was taken literally or allegorically according to the need of the interpreter. So with the New Testament writers, whose method is in general that of the Talmud, only "more cautious and reserved."

Perhaps Dr. Toy's most important book is *Judaism and Christianity, a Sketch of the Progress of Thought from Old Testament to New Testament* (1890). The Introduction discusses in a comprehensive, philosophic way the general laws of advance from national to universal religions. The eight chapters of the work deal successively with the literature, the doctrine of God, subordinate supernatural beings, man, ethics, the kingdom of God, eschatology, and the relation of Jesus to Christianity. In regard to Jesus, Dr. Toy sees in the New Testament several diverse views: the Jewish, in the Synoptic Gospels; the Pauline, in the writings of the Apostle; and the Alexandrian, resulting from the union of Greek philosophical speculation with Jewish theology, in the Fourth Gospel. But in spite of this diversity and of all subsequent changes, the person of Jesus has been central in religious life. "Whatever the particular construction of theology, whether he be regarded as substantially divine or only as a profoundly inspired man, whether Church or Bible be accepted as infallible guide, he is ever the leader and model of religious experience." "The fundamental truths which he announced are as new as they were in his time." The great themes of this remarkable volume are treated in

Dr. Toy's best manner, with fulness of learning, careful discriminations, sympathy, spiritual poise, elevation of thought, and in a style simple, clear, and eloquent. The story is told with so much life and so convincingly that the reader feels himself to be actually contemporary with the events recorded. Only a profound student and thinker could produce such a work.

Introduction to the History of Religions (1913) is Dr. Toy's last book, and shows him at his best in the range of the inquiry, the accuracy and minuteness of the research. The object of the book is "to describe the principal customs and ideas that underlie all public religion." While the work is devoted to primitive religions, "references to the higher religions are introduced for the purpose of illustrating lines of progress." The thought is clear but condensed. No useless word is allowed, and fact crowds relentlessly on fact. The vast mass of material, bewildering in its complexity, is reduced to order, and the common bond that underlies widely diverse custom and ceremonial is brought to light.

Dr. Toy published three critical exegetical books on the Old Testament, all in 1899. They are: *The Book of the Prophet Ezekiel. Critical Edition of the Hebrew Text, with Notes*; *The Book of the Prophet Ezekiel. A New English Translation, with Explanatory Notes and Pictorial Illustrations*; and *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Proverbs*. For the production of such works Dr. Toy had in an eminent degree the necessary qualifications, fulness of learning, patience, poise, sanity of judgment, a keen critical faculty, a clear and logical mind, the power to grasp and state the essential thought, brevity of statement, and felicity of expression.

Doubtless there would be many more volumes to the credit of Dr. Toy, had he not devoted so much attention to editorial work and to contributions published in encyclopædias, magazines, and journals. A partial list,

prepared by Dr. Harry A. Wolfson, is given in *Studies in the History of Religions*, mentioned above. From the foundation of *The New World* he was one of the editors (1892–1900). Besides his editorial labors he contributed to this magazine six learned articles and seventy-four book reviews. He was a member of the editorial board of the *Jewish Encyclopedia* (1901–1906), contributing to all of the twelve volumes, and having charge of the departments of Hebrew Philology and Hellenistic Literature. He contributed to about twenty journals, both technical and literary, to some of them many times. To the *Harvard Theological Review* he contributed two elaborate articles, one on Pan-Babylonianism, and one on the Islam of the Koran. If space allowed, it would be rewarding to examine some of these contributions. One at least may be mentioned — the Duddleian Lecture for 1899, published in the *Christian Register* for January 18, 1900. The subject, Pope Leo XIII, lies in a controverted field, but is handled with such breadth, wealth of learning, and conclusiveness, that the positions taken by the lecturer are incontrovertible.

This is but an imperfect sketch of Dr. Toy's life and work. Those who knew him well will not fail, I hope, to recognize the sketch as true, so far as it goes. But beyond and above these life-incidents was the man himself. To characterize him as man I venture to quote from the minute prepared by three of his colleagues who had been his pupils, and published in the *Harvard University Gazette* for June 14, 1919.

“ Dr. Toy was a cultivated gentleman of the old Southern type, courtly, considerate, deferential, sympathetic. His wide reading and his many-sided learning, in archaeology, history, language, literature, theology, religion, music, politics, and philosophy, made him a centre in any group, and notably in circles of scholars of kindred interests.

“ He had a boundless passion for learning, great industry in the pursuit of it, the power of severe and sustained application. Through

a retentive memory he had always at command the great stores of learning which he had gathered by wide reading in many languages. Not less marked were his courage, both physical and moral, his imperturbable poise, his complete freedom from self-seeking, his catholicity of spirit, his geniality of speech and manner, his quiet and inoffensive humor. His temper was judicial, his discriminations keen, his judgments sane. In criticism he was kindly and just, in statement clear, in expression felicitous. He was always interested in younger scholars, and to this interest age brought no abatement.

“ Dr. Toy was essentially an investigator and pioneer. His studies in Biblical Science and in Religions and his frankness of utterance mark the beginning of a new epoch in American scholarship. Yet he seemed altogether unconscious of his own greatness. With all his learning and honors he was at heart as simple and guileless as a child. He belongs in the class of the sages of olden time. He followed after wisdom, and received the fulfilment of her promise, ‘ Length of days, and years of life, and peace.’ ”

RECENT DISCOVERIES IN ETHIOPIA

GEORGE A. REISNER

HARVARD CAMP, GIZA PYRAMIDS, EGYPT

Ethiopia or Cush extends from the upper end of the First Cataract in the Nile southwards to somewhere near the junction of the White and the Blue Niles at Khartum. Strictly speaking, the name "Cush" was applied by the ancient Egyptians to that part of the valley which lies between the Second and the Fourth Cataracts while the name "Wawat" was given to that between the First and Second Cataracts. More general names were "Ta-set" (or perhaps "Ta-Khent"), "Khenthennefer," and "Ta-nehsi" (= Land of the Negroes), and a still more general name was "The Southern Lands," applied to all the southland including Wawat, Cush, Punt and the tribal districts along the Red Sea and in the eastern and the western deserts. The people of Ethiopia are usually called *neh̄si* which is translated inaccurately "negro;" and *neh̄si* are represented in the monuments as typical woolly-haired black men. But it is clear from the pictures of men from Ethiopia and from the skeletons found in the ancient cemeteries that Ethiopia was inhabited by a race, dark-skinned it is true, but easily distinguished from the true negro. Thus it is probable that the proverb in Jeremiah 13 23 ("Can the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard his spots?") was founded on the Egyptian tradition rather than on a first-hand knowledge of the Ethiopians.

The land of Ethiopia is the most barren part of the Nile valley, almost the only part which might be called poverty-stricken. Through the greater length of the country, the only cultivable fields are little patches of dark soil laid down in the mouths of the side ravines

which have been cut by the rare rain-fed desert torrents. A hundred miles of the valley above Halfa is so desolate that it is now called "the Belly of the Rock." Even in the most fruitful stretches, which are in southern Cush or Dongola Province, the cornland is rarely more than a few hundred yards across from desert to river bank. It is one of the seeming paradoxes of history that so unfertile a country should have been an object of desire to one great empire after another, and a still greater paradox that a royal family, grown great on such soil, should have mastered the whole of the Nile valley from Khartum to the sea. But the material resources of Ethiopia lay, not in fields, grazing lands, and in forests, but in the control of roads and water. The river is the only ample source of water as well as a great traffic way, and all the roads from Egypt to the south return to its banks. The communications with the ancient gold mines in the eastern desert depended on short roads which debouched into the valley. The great caravan routes from the north were three in number — the first along the eastern bank, the second along the western bank, and the third through the chain of oases which runs parallel to the valley in the western desert. The river itself and all these roads were at the mercy of him who held the control of Ethiopia. There is a fourth way — by ship through the Red Sea; but the harbors of this route on the western shore of the sea were also under Ethiopian control. From the region of Berber, caravan roads strike out east and west and south, to the Red Sea, to Darfur, to Abyssinia, and the headwaters of the Atbára, the Dinder, the Blue and the White Nile. Along all these roads, commanded by rulers of Ethiopia, caravans went northwards bearing ivory, leopard skins, ostrich eggs and feathers, resins, myrrh, incense, various plant products, gold, and black slaves, and southwards caravans bearing the products of Egypt — cloth, amulets and ornaments, alabaster vases of per-

fume, bronze tools and weapons. In all times the material resources of the governing power in Ethiopia have consisted of the income derived from taxing in one way or other this great trade and in exploiting the gold mines. The agricultural produce has barely supported a meagre population, and no industries were initiated except under Egyptian influence.

In addition to the information contained in a large number of inscriptions found in Egyptian tombs and on the rocks of Nubia, the material for the ancient history of Ethiopia has been enriched in recent years by the excavations of the Nubian Archæological Survey ¹ between Assuan and Dakka, and by those of the Harvard-Boston expedition at Kerma ² and at Napata.³ The excavations at Napata — Gebel Barkal, Nuri, and el-Kurruw — have yielded among other results the tombs of all the independent kings of Ethiopia, twenty-five in number, from 750 to about 300 B.C., and what is much more important, the chronological order of these kings. Thus the foundation is now laid for a history of Ethiopia including that part where it touches the history of Palestine. But to make clear the character of the Ethiopian monarchy of the time of Hezekiah and Isaiah it is necessary to review briefly the earlier history of the land and its people.

The history of Ethiopia falls into three great periods previous to 1000 B.C.⁴ — (a) that of the Egyptian trading caravans, from before the Fourth Dynasty (2900 B.C.) to the Middle Empire (2000 B.C.); (b) that of the Egyptian occupation, from the Twelfth Dynasty to the Hyksos period (2000 to 1600 B.C.); and (c) that of the Egyptian Viceroyalty, from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth

¹ Reisner, Nubian Archæological Survey, Bulletins Nos. 1-4; Report, 1907-1908; Firth, Nubian Archæological Survey, Bulletins Nos. 5-7; Reports, 1908-1910.

² Reisner, Bulletin of the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, Nos. 69, 80.

³ Ibid., Nos. 89, 97; Journal of Egyptian Archæology, IV, 213-227; V, 99-112.

⁴ Reisner, Sudan Notes and Records, I, 3-17, 57-79, 217-237; II, 35-67.

Dynasties (1550 to 1100 B.C.). In all these periods Egypt was the determining factor in the life of Ethiopia, and the interest of Egypt lay largely in the trade with the south, but in the third period in the exploitation of the gold mines as well. During the first of these periods the deeds of the great caravan leaders — Kharkhuf, Pepynekt, Sebni, and Thety — are fairly well known from their tomb inscriptions. The remains of one of their trading stations dated by inscriptions was excavated by our expedition at Kerma; and the desolated character of the No Man's Land of Lower Nubia has been revealed by the Nubian Archæological Survey. During the second period, Cush was permanently occupied by an Egyptian force under a governor and accompanied by craftsmen and officials. The fortified administrative center, part of the town, two of the mortuary temples, and the great cemetery were excavated by the Harvard-Boston expedition at Kerma. This town was in fact an Egyptian colony settled at the upper end of the Third Cataract and commanding the most important part of Cush. That it was a real colony is shown by the fact that a curious Egypto-Nubian set of crafts and customs was initiated and ran a course of development which can be traced for over four centuries.

After the reconquest of Ethiopia by Ahmose I and Amenophis I, the third period was opened about 1550 B.C. by the establishment of an Egyptian Viceroyalty, the first holder of which was the titular "king's son" Thure, appointed by Amenophis I. The communications with Egypt were now chiefly by water and were kept permanently open, so that the Egyptian administration in Ethiopia lost its isolated colonial character. King's messengers and inspectors of the central bureaus of Thebes passed to and fro, and yearly the tribute fleet went down to Thebes, probably during the inundation. We have a list, perhaps complete, of twenty-three successive Egyp-

tian viceroys in Ethiopia, extending from about 1548 to about 1080 B.C., from Thure of the Eighteenth Dynasty to Paiankh of the Twenty-first. Temples were built at Napata, Gematon (Kawa), Delgo, Soleb, Semneh, Buhen (Halfa) in Cush proper, as well as the well known great series between Halfa and Assuan. Many of the forts built to safeguard the roads in the Middle Empire were still held. At each temple and fort there was an Egyptian community of officials, soldiers, and priests, while the cemeteries prove that other Egyptian communities were settled in almost every cultivable area in Lower Nubia and probably southwards of that. Some remnant of the older negroid population must have remained; but it was culturally Egyptianized, and by the end of this long period of four and a half centuries Ethiopia was a part of Egypt in administration, religion, and crafts, although the racial mixture was not purely Egyptian. A second great center of the religion of Amon-Ra was established at Napata (temple B 500, excavated by the Harvard-Boston expedition), and it may be taken as certain that the priesthood of Amon in Napata walked in the ways of the priesthood of Amon in Karnak.

For the period from 1000 to 250 B.C. the material for a historical reconstruction has hitherto been wanting, except for the brief period of about half a century (715-663 B.C.), when the kings of Ethiopia — Shabaka, Shabataka, and Tirhakah — ruled Egypt as an Ethiopian province. But in 1916, the Harvard-Boston expedition discovered the great royal cemetery begun by Tirhakah at Nuri, and in 1919 the old family cemetery begun by the founder of the Ethiopian royal family at el-Kurruw. Both of these cemeteries are within a ten-mile radius of Gebel Barkal, the religious center of Napata, the capital of Ethiopia. It has fortunately been possible by means of the archæological material to arrange all these tombs in a chronological order, which is certain except for two

minor details toward the end of the list. Thus the basis has now been won for beginning a connected history of the first independent kingdom of Ethiopia, that whose capital was at Napata from about 900 B.C. to about 300 B.C.

The remarkable fact appears from the graves of the six generations of ancestors found at el-Kurruw that the royal family of Ethiopia was Libyan in origin, and from a stela of a wife of Piankhy that they were of the southern Libyans, the Temehuw. The chief of the first generation had among his grave-furniture flint and chalcedony arrow-points of well known Libyan types, but also such an amount of gold and of first-rate Egyptian faïences and alabasters that he must have been in control of part if not the whole of the resources of Ethiopia. His date I estimate at about 900 B.C. plus or minus 20 years. It would thus appear that the movement of the northern Libyan tribes into the Delta was accompanied, or followed, by a movement of the southern Libyans into Ethiopia. The obvious road for the penetration of Ethiopia by the southern Libyans would be through the Selima Oasis road, used from the earliest times to the present day. About 900 B.C. the chief of the Libyan invaders was settled at el-Kurruw, and here was the seat of the family certainly until the reign of Tirhakah. The graves of the first three generations show a progressive increase in the size and magnificence of the tombs; the next three generations were practically at a standstill, but the chief of the last of them was undoubtedly Kashta, who held the title of "king." The chiefs of these — the fourth to sixth — generations probably all called themselves "kings of Cush," and the chief of the seventh generation was Piankhy, the conqueror of Egypt, who assumed the fivefold titulary of a king of Egypt. Then follow, at el-Kurruw the tombs of Shabaka and Shabataka, at Nuri the tomb of Tirhakah, and, returning to

el-Kurruw, the tomb of Tanutaman beside the pyramid of his father Shabaka.

Now it must be remembered that Ethiopia was as completely a cultural part of Egypt as the Delta; and the Temehu Libyans of Ethiopia became as thoroughly Egyptianized as the Meshwesh Libyans of the Delta. The Meshwesh, coming earlier and into a richer part of the Nile Valley, were the first to gain political power, and ruled Egypt as the Twenty-second and Twenty-third Dynasties for two centuries. But the growth of the feudal character of their government led in the early part of the eighth century to a disintegration of the kingdom into more or less independent provincial principalities, of which Ethiopia was without doubt the most powerful, probably the first to attain complete independence. It is certain that about 750, Kashta, king of Ethiopia, already held Thebes and had forced the adoption of his daughter, Amenirdis I, as heir to the high-priesthood of Amon-Ra by Shepenwepet I, the daughter of Osorkon III. Piankhy, when he set out to defend his territory against the rising power of Tefnekht, a prince of Libyan origin who had gained control of Memphis and the Delta, counted himself over-lord of Middle Egypt as far as Heracleopolis. With the submission of Tefnekht, the whole of Lower Egypt came under the sovereignty of Piankhy; but Tefnekht remained prince of that region as the representative of the Ethiopian king. Thus the feudal system of government was applied by Piankhy to Lower Egypt and was still in existence in the time of Tirhakah and Assurbanipal. But Piankhy and his successors maintained a standing army and military agents in Egypt whose duty it was to preserve order and collect the tribute of the vassal princes.

Thus at the time when the kings of Assyria were conquering Palestine, the Egyptianized Libyan kings of Ethiopia were forcing their supremacy over Egypt and

transferring the political capital of the whole kingdom to Napata. As I mentioned above, the Ethiopians were not negroes, and their royal family, Libyan in origin, shows in their portrait-statues no trace of negro blood. We have now portraits of Tirhakah, Tanutaman, Atlanersa, Senkamanseken, Anlaman, and Aspalta (the fourth generation after Tirhakah), and the negro head given to Tirhakah by the sculptor of Esarhaddon on the Senjirli stela simply represents the prevailing idea of Ethiopians as "*nehši*," spread no doubt by the Egyptians. The ruling class in Ethiopia was Egyptian in culture, and indeed the royal family considered itself as peculiarly the favored people of Amon-Ra, the national god of Egypt.

Some historians have distinguished two Kashtas and as many as four Piankhyss.⁵ That confusion is now swept away by the excavations at Napata, and the list may be set forth with certainty as to the order of the names but not as to all the dates. Starting with 525 B.C. as the date of the conquest of Egypt by Cambyses, the maximum known reigns of the Twenty-sixth Dynasty⁶ give us 663 (with a possible error of a few months) for the end of the reign of Tirhakah. The reign of Tirhakah is known from one of the Serapeum inscriptions to have lasted twenty-six years and a few months. But beyond that the reigns are uncertain. For Shabataka the only date in the monuments is the third year, although Manetho gives him twelve or fourteen (Africanus) years. From the reign of Shabaka, a date in his twelfth year is preserved and one in his fifteenth (Dr. Budge), while Manetho again reports twelve years. Finally, the Conquest stela of Piankhy is dated in his twenty-first year, and the strip of linen in the British Museum purchased by Greene gives a period which is more than twenty and pos-

⁵ Petrie, *History of Egypt*, III, 279; Gauthier, *Livre des rois d'Egypte*, IV, 2, 24, 50, 51.

⁶ Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, I, 47; IV, 518, 519.

sibly more than forty years. With this material it is only possible to set out a series of dates which show a cumulative limit of error as the date recedes from 663 B.C. backwards (Kashta is numbered six, allowing five numbers for the ancestral chiefs found in the tombs, el-Kurruw, Tumulus I and XIX, Mastabas IX, XI, and XXIII):

	King of	Max.	Min.	Probable
6. KASHTA,	Ethiopia
	Ethiopia and Thebes	-743
7. PIANKHY,	Ethiopia and Thebes	755-734	733-712	743-722
son of 6.	Ethiopia and Egypt	734-715	712-704	722-714
8. SHABAKA,	Ethiopia and Egypt	715-701	704-692	714-700
son of 6.				
9. SHABATAKA,	Ethiopia and Egypt	701-689	692-688	700-689
son of 8.				
10. TIRHAKAH,	Ethiopia and Egypt	689-663	688-663	689-663
son of 7.				
11. TANUTAMAN,	Ethiopia and Egypt	663-661	663-661	663-661
son of 8.	Ethiopia and Thebes	661-655	661-655	661-655
	Ethiopia	655-653	655-653(?)	655-653(?)

In the probable dates I take Piankhy's reign at about twenty-nine years, based on the date in the hieratic inscription on linen, and Shabataka's at twelve years, based on Manetho and the archæological evidence at el-Kurruw.

The history of the relations between the kings of Ethiopia on the one hand and those of Assyria and Palestine on the other depends entirely on the Biblical and the cuneiform documents. It is true that Tanutaman in the Dream stela⁷ gives an account of his campaign to recover Egypt in 663, but he speaks of the Assyrian appointees merely as rebels and gives no hint of the conflict with Assurbanipal. For some time false conclusions were drawn from the Assyrian and the Hebrew materials owing to the confusion between "Cush" in Arabia and Cush-Ethiopia, and that between "Mušri" in Arabia and the Semitic name for Egypt. That difficulty was

⁷ Breasted, *loc. cit.*, IV, 468 f.

definitely cleared away by Professor Winckler;⁸ and it may now be accepted that the Assyrian annals of this period do not refer to Egypt before the reign of Esarhaddon, and that the only Biblical reference to Ethiopia of possible historical value is that to Tirhakah in II Kings 18, 19 (Is. 36, 37). The identification of So, king of Muṣri (in Arabia), in II Kings 17 4 (minimum date, 724), with Shabaka, king of Egypt (maximum date, 715), is obviously a mistake, while the Muṣri, which with Milukhkha attempted to relieve Ekron in Sennacherib's campaign of 701, was certainly the Arabian Muṣri, not Egypt. The reference in II Chron. 14 9-15 to Zerah the Cushite and his war with Asa of Judah, does not relate to Cush-Ethiopia but to the Arabian Cush (cf. II Chron. 21 16).

The utilization of the cuneiform material as far as it concerns Egypt under the Ethiopian dynasty is fairly easy. The chief events may be summarized as follows:⁹

- 705. Sargon killed in battle. Sennacherib came to the throne and was confronted by widespread resistance.
- 704-3. Campaign against Merodach-baladan and pacification of Babylonia.
- 702. Against the Kassites.
- 701. Campaign against Phoenicia, Philistia, and Judah. Attempt of the Arabian Musri and Milukhkha to relieve Ekron; their defeat at Eltekeh. Hezekiah pays tribute, but Jerusalem is not taken.
- 700-681. Sennacherib occupied in the East; Syria and Palestine apparently quietly tributary.
- 681. Sennacherib assassinated. Esarhaddon became king.
- 676-5. Abdimilkuti of Sidon, having revolted, was conquered and beheaded, together with his ally, Sanduarri of Kundi and Sizu.
- 674. Invasion of Arabia.

⁸ Winckler, *Mitteilungen d. vorderasiat. Ges.*, III (1898), Nos. 1, 4; XI (1906), 102-116; to Cush, p. 106; *Altorientalische Forschungen*, I, 24-41.

⁹ See for example, Paton, *Early History of Syria and Palestine*, pp. 248 ff.; Winckler, *Altorientalische Forschungen*, I, 410-415, 525.

673. Invasion of Egypt and defeat of the Assyrians in Egypt (Knudtzon).
- 672-1. Campaign against Rurisa; perhaps also other eastern campaigns; perhaps beginning of internal troubles.
670. Invasion of Egypt. Defeat of Tirhakah at Iskhupri on third Tammuz; pursuit of Egyptian army to Memphis; Memphis taken on twelfth Tammuz; further battles (south of Memphis?) on sixteenth and eighteenth of Tammuz. Submission of Egyptian vassals of Tirhakah as far as Thebes: their appointment as vassals of Esarhaddon. Tirhakah resumes his over-lordship apparently immediately after the departure of the Assyrian army.
669. Internal strife in Assyria between Esarhaddon and the officials and officers; many executions; solution found in appointment of Assurbanipal to be crown prince of Assyria, Shamashshumukin of Babylonia.
668. Esarhaddon marches again to Egypt and dies on the road. Assurbanipal continues the campaign and describes it as his own. Battle at Karbaniti; capture of Memphis; flight of Tirhakah [one month and ten days later, Thebes taken and plundered (K 2675)]. The twenty-two dynasts reestablished as Assyrian vassals; Assyrian garrison left in Egypt.
- 668-663. Intrigues between Tirhakah and the dynasts of Sais, Mendes, and Tanis (Delta alone in Assyrian control). Assyrian commanders quell the revolt and send the three kings to Nineveh. Necho of Sais pardoned and restored as king in Sais. Tirhakah dies and is followed by Tanutaman, son of Shabaka.
- 663-2. Tanutaman retakes Memphis, and Assurbanipal makes his second campaign to Egypt (according to Tanutaman's Dream stela, Tanutaman took Memphis and received the submission of the Delta dynasts). Memphis taken without a battle; Thebes, after a march of one month and ten days, taken and plundered; Tanutaman flies to Kipkip (unknown place in the south).
- Thereafter the only mention in the annals of Assurbanipal is that referring to the alliance between Gyges and Psammetik I, in which the latter is said to have thrown off the Assyrian yoke.

These are the chief events; but there was also the revolt of Baal of Tyre, which Professor Winckler¹⁰ has reconstructed, with so much insight into the history of the times, somewhat as follows: Baal, disappointed at not regaining his territory on the mainland, made an alliance with Tirhakah and revolted in 673. Esarhaddon besieged Tyre and attacked Tirhakah, but was defeated by the latter. The siege of Tyre continued, and in 670 after the victory of Iskhupri Baal offered submission. But on the return of Tirhakah to Memphis Baal withdrew his submission, and therefore the Senjirli stela, on which Baal is represented behind Tirhakah, makes no mention of Baal. The siege lasted until Assurbanipal defeated Tirhakah in 688, when Baal gave up, thus having resisted for five years as related by Menander (Josephus). The final taking of Tyre is recorded as Assurbanipal's "third campaign." The first half of this reconstruction, it must be confessed, has little material support, (a) from the annals of Esarhaddon,¹¹ where the names of Baal and Tarku are both restorations by Winckler on the basis of the sign *ri* taken as the end of Sur-ri (Tyre); (b) a treaty between Baal of Tyre and Esarhaddon,¹² the date of which is impossible to determine (I question any date after 674); and (c) Assurbanipal.¹³ Thus there is no evidence against the following reconstruction: submission of Baal and treaty at the beginning of the reign of Esarhaddon; defeat of Esarhaddon in Egypt in 673; consequent revolt of Baal without any instigation by or alliance with Tirhakah; and later events as given by Winckler.

The character of the kings of the Ethiopian dynasty of Egypt as drawn from their inscriptions, their monu-

¹⁰ Winckler, *loc. cit.*, I, 524-526; II, 10-16.

¹¹ K 2671 (see Winckler, *Forschungen*, I, 524).

¹² K 3500 + 4444 + 10235 (*loc. cit.*, II, 10f.; and Peiser, *Mitteilungen d. vorderasiat. Ges.*, III, No. 6, pp. 1-14.)

¹³ Rassam Cyl., II, 49-66.

ments, and their burial customs, was proud and boastful, but at the same time bold and devoid of fear. Against the foes they had met previous to the coming of the Assyrians, they had been universally successful. They believed themselves the favorites of Amon-Ra and were confident in his power. Piankhy, Shabaka, and Shabataka appear to have spent little time in Egypt, and Tirhakah was the first to reside there. He had come down from Napata when a young man of twenty (Tanis stela ¹⁴), and had been crowned in Egypt. His predecessors, living at Napata, could hardly have taken any interest in affairs beyond their borders. Fragments of one tablet (or two) with the impression of the seal of Shabaka were found at Nineveh,¹⁵ but this tablet (or these tablets) may have contained only formal greetings. The Ethiopian kings could conceive of no land so rich and desirable as Egypt — their own land — of no ruler so powerful as themselves, of no god the equal of Amon-Ra. As far as we know, they never indulged in foreign adventures, and even the battles fought by Tirhakah against the Assyrians were in every case fought on Egyptian soil. For of course the conquest of Egypt by the Egyptian province, Ethiopia, was not a foreign war. Thus it is unlikely that Tirhakah played anything more than a passive part in Palestine and Syria. Information was brought to him no doubt, and probably messengers, perhaps even from Baal of Tyre, were received with hospitality; but why should Tirhakah seek to make trouble for Assyria? And why, if he had made trouble, did he make no effort to utilize the situation?

The news of the defeat of Assyria in Egypt in 673 must have sent a quiver through the whole of western Asia, and was duly noted in the dry record of the Babylonian chronicle. Yet the only consequence was the revolt of

¹⁴ Petrie, Tanis, II, pl. IX, No. 163; Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, IV, 456.

¹⁵ Budge, *The Egyptian Sudan*, II, 30.

Baal of Tyre. Palestine continued quietly paying tribute, and neither the hieroglyphic nor the Assyrian inscriptions preserved to us contain any hint that Tirhakah attempted to advance beyond his own borders either then or at any other time. On the other hand, the part of agitator in Palestine and Syria, assigned to Tirhakah, is contrary to the character and the general conduct of that king, as far as is known. I imagine that the victory of 673 only made Tirhakah more confident of his power and of his impregnable position. Nor do we need to assume an alliance between Baal and Tirhakah to find a motive for Esarhaddon's invasion of Egypt in that year. Egypt was the richest land left unplundered by the Assyrians, a land capable of an enormous annual tribute; while to the army which had penetrated Arabia in 674, the crossing of the desert between Palestine and Egypt was not a matter of too great difficulty. Both before and since then, other armies have made the trip with comparative ease, time and time again. Thus I come to the conclusion that Baal did not revolt before the Assyrian defeat of 673 at the instigation of Tirhakah, but afterwards, encouraged thereto by that defeat and trusting to the strength of Tirhakah only in the sense that they had a common enemy — Assyria.

As for the subsequent struggle between the Assyrians and Tirhakah, the one point in doubt is whether Assurbanipal took Thebes in 668 as well as in 663. Winckler¹⁶ believed that the account in K 2675 resulted from a confusion of the two campaigns by a scribe. Professor Breasted¹⁷ has pointed out that the large restorations carried out at Thebes for Tirhakah by Mentuemhat (one of the vassals in the list of Assyrian appointees) could only have been made during the period previous to 663, that they were probably made between 668 and

¹⁶ Winckler, *Altorientalische Forschungen*, I, 478 f.

¹⁷ Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, IV, 460.

663 and indicate that Thebes had been looted in 668. But that conclusion is by no means certain and the question must remain in doubt. However this may be, the chief point is that Tirhakah had no difficulty in reestablishing himself after his defeat in 670, and that he recovered Upper Egypt after the fall of Thebes in 668. He was bold and obstinate in his stand against Assyria, as befitted a great king fighting on his own soil for his own country.

Assyria attempted to hold Lower Egypt on the same feudatory system as that already in use by the Egyptians and with the same princes; but Assyria was too far away to exercise an efficient control over this form of administration even when under the watchful eyes of Assyrian officers. The vassal princes of Egypt must have been galled by the oversight of foreign soldiers and preferred the lighter yoke of their own kinsmen. Assurbanipal confesses his constant difficulties, and finally appears to have adopted the expedient of setting up Necho at Sais and Memphis as a rival of Tirhakah. At this point a contemporary document, the Dream stela of Tanutaman,¹⁸ informs us that Tanutaman in his first year (663 B.C.) saw in a dream two serpents, which was interpreted to mean that he would be king over both the southland and the northland. He was then crowned in Napata, and went downstream stopping at all the principal temples to make offerings until he came against the "rebels" at Memphis. That is, Upper Egypt down to, but not including Memphis, had passed to him at the coronation in Napata. He took Memphis by assault and advanced without resistance into the Delta. After Tanutaman's return to Memphis the Delta princes came in and submitted. As this must have been in 663, the last campaign of Assurbanipal could not have been before that year and may indeed have been a year or two later. As late as

¹⁸ Breasted, *loc. cit.*, IV, 468 f.

656-55, a stela found at Thebes¹⁹ is dated in the ninth year of Tanutaman. Psammetik I, the son of Assurbanipal's favorite, Necho, counted his reign from 663 B.C., but he did not obtain Thebes until his tenth year. It is clear that Tanutaman lived and held Thebes until 655, when he either died or was forced to withdraw to Ethiopia. We have no further evidence of Ethiopian activity in Egypt, unless it be the fragment of a faïence plaque bearing the name of Senkamanseken (second king after Tanutaman), recorded from Memphis by M. Daressy.

With this outline of the relations between Assyria and Egypt in the Ethiopian period in hand, the passage in II Kings 18, 19, Isaiah 36, 37, may now be examined. Stade's division of the text into three parts has been generally accepted — (a) II Kings 18 14-16, (b) 18 13, 17-37, and 19 1-9, (c) 19 10-37.²⁰ Winckler and others raise a question as to whether 18 13 belongs to (a) or (b), and whether 19 9 belongs wholly or in part to (b) or (c). It is not a vital matter from my standpoint whether the Tirhakah verse belongs to (b) or (c), but I agree with Winckler in concluding that it is the introduction of (c). As it is admitted that Tirhakah could not have been "king of Ethiopia" in 701, two explanations have been favored — (1) that Tirhakah was commander of an army belonging to Shabaka (or Shabataka), and was either regent of Egypt or was given a title which he acquired later; (2) that Sennacherib made a later campaign and a siege of Jerusalem at a time when he, Hezekiah, and Tirhakah were, all three, kings of their respective countries.

It may be observed in the first place that Tirhakah in the hieroglyphic inscriptions bears one or more of the five traditional titles of the king of Egypt. These five titles have usually different names attached to them, but

¹⁹ Gauthier, *Livre des rois d'Égypte*, IV, 43, 68.

²⁰ Stade, *Zeitschrift für alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1886, pp. 173 f.; Winckler, *Alttestamentliche Untersuchungen*, p. 31; *Mitteilungen d. vorderasiat. Ges.*, III, No. 1, p. 33; Prasek, *Mitteilungen d. vorderasiat. Ges.*, VIII, No. 4.

the Ethiopian kings of this period were fond of using the same name with the first two or three titles. The name by which each one is now called is that attached to the title "son of Ra," and thus Tirhakah was "the son of Ra, Tirhakah;" but the Ethiopians sometimes used the personal name with the title "king of Upper and Lower Egypt." It is only on his funerary vases and figures, found in his tomb at Nuri, that Tirhakah is called simply "the Osiris, the king, Tirhakah." In the cuneiform inscriptions of Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal, Tirhakah is called "king of Egypt and Ethiopia," except in one case, where *after the capture of Thebes in 668* he is called "king of Ethiopia."²¹ After 668, an Assyrian or a friend of Assyria might have referred to Tirhakah as "king of Ethiopia," and after 655, when Egypt and Ethiopia were divided into separate kingdoms, any writer might have given one of the Ethiopian kings of Egypt the title "king of Ethiopia," although it was inexact. But it is extremely improbable that any document of the time of Sennacherib could have described Tirhakah as "king of Ethiopia."

It is now quite clear that in 701, Tirhakah was neither king nor regent, and not even crown prince. The curious succession of the kings of Ethiopia (see above) excludes a law of direct inheritance from father to son, and rather implies that the succession fell to the eldest, or perhaps the most capable, member of the family. In 701, in the reign of Shabaka, the heir-apparent must have been Shabataka, who became king on the death of Shabaka. Tirhakah was passed over, although he was the son of Piankhy, the predecessor of Shabaka. He was neither old enough nor politically strong enough to take precedence of Shabataka; but when Shabataka died, he did take precedence of Shabaka's other son Tanutaman.²²

²¹ Rassam Cyl. C, I, line 123.

²² At el-Kurruw, Tirhakah buried Shabataka in the same state as Shabataka had buried Shabaka, and the queens of Shabataka he buried in tombs and with furniture like those of his own queens at Nuri.

According to the stela found at Tanis²³ which celebrates the visit to Egypt of Queen Aqlaqa, mother of Tirhakah and presumably a queen of Piankhy's, to see the glory of her son *after he had been crowned in Egypt*, Tirhakah left Napata when a youth of twenty and had not seen his mother since. The inference is that it was a long time, but the mutilated inscription gives no evidence by which the date of his coming to Egypt might be reckoned. Even if his coming was before 701, it could not have been much before, and Tirhakah must have been too young to have had the chief command in Egypt before the reign of Shabataka. Moreover the danger of having a member of the royal family so close to the succession in a position of such power would have been obvious to an old Oriental like Shabaka. It is not only impossible for me to accept the conclusion that Tirhakah led an army against Sennacherib for Shabaka, but even the conclusion that any Egyptian army crossed the frontiers of Egypt in 701. That conclusion would be contrary to the whole character of the Ethiopian kings and their settled foreign policy, as I judge it to have been and as it appears even in Tirhakah's wars with the Assyrians. Indeed it is quite clear that the power to which Hezekiah trusted and of which Isaiah must have spoken was Muṣri in Arabia, not the Egypt of the Ethiopian kings. Sennacherib relates that "the kings of Mu-ṣu-ri" summoned the forces of the king of Milukhkha and attempted to relieve Ekron. The relief of Ekron meant the defeat of the Assyrians and the relief of Jerusalem and all Palestine.

As for the second explanation whereby II Kings 19 9-37 is taken to be a record of a second expedition to Palestine and a second siege of Jerusalem by Sennacherib, the chronological conclusions appear to be against it. According to the most reasonable conclusions on Judæan

²³ Petrie, Tanis, II, pl. IX, No. 163; Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, IV, 456.

chronology, Hezekiah ceased to reign in 691, while the Egyptian material shows that Tirhakah could not have come to the throne before 689. The annals of Sennacherib for the latter part of his reign are wanting, and the evidence for a later campaign to Palestine is based on the observation of Professor Winckler that Esarhaddon in Cyl. A, II, lines 55 ff. says that his father Sennacherib had captured Adumu the stronghold of Aribi-land. This expedition, which is not recorded in the known annals, must have taken place in the second half of the reign of Sennacherib, and proves, provided Adumu lies south of Palestine, that Sennacherib in later years passed by Jerusalem with an army. But in addition to the fact that the location of Adumu is unknown except that it was in territory inhabited by Arabs, the evidence is a long way from permitting the deduction that Sennacherib besieged Jerusalem between 691 and 681. The distinction which Dr. Prasek²⁴ makes between the military operations of Sennacherib at Jerusalem in 701 and a "siege," is unconvincing. The suggestion of a second siege depends in fact on nothing except the passage which it was invented to explain. And finally, the character of Tirhakah's foreign policy makes against the supposition of a foreign campaign in 691-681 as much as in 701. In 673, 670, and 688, Tirhakah met the Assyrians on Egyptian soil, and even after his victory of 673 did not interfere in Palestine. He was neither afraid of invasion nor covetous of so undesirable an addition to his territory as Palestine.

Considering then the reference to Tirhakah in II Kings 19 9 in the light of the above examination, the whole of part (c) of the passage presents a combination of Sennacherib, Hezekiah, and Tirhakah "king of Ethiopia"

²⁴ Stade, *Zeitschrift für alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1886, pp. 173 f.; Winckler, *Alttestamentliche Untersuchungen*, p. 31; *Mitteilungen d. vorderasiat. Ges.*, III, No. 1, p. 33; Prasek, *Mitteilungen d. vorderasiat. Ges.*, VIII, No. 4.

which is a historical impossibility. So far I was bound to go in my examinations of all possible materials for the history of Ethiopia. I may add that as a consequence I come to the conclusion that the editor of II Kings, having a late version of the prophetic utterances of Isaiah which he wished to incorporate with part (b), provided an introduction from his general knowledge of history to distinguish it from part (b). It is of course possible that he believed part (c) to have been another occasion, or that he found part (c) with its introduction already in existence dressed up by some former editor. The composer of part (c) in its present form appears to have had a confused knowledge of Tirhakah's wars with Esarhad-don and Assurbanipal, and possibly of the relief expedition from Muṣri, which he naturally confused with Egypt.²⁵

To sum up, the royal family of Ethiopia, to which belonged the kings of the Egyptian Twenty-fifth Dynasty, took its origin from a Libyan chief who settled at Napata about 900 B.C. Ethiopia was then as always the land of the southern roads, and thus the material resources on which this chief and his descendants founded the family fortunes came from the control of the trade routes and the gold mines. The normal population supported by the agricultural areas of Ethiopia is small, but with a large income from the traffic the rulers of Ethiopia were able to draw levies from the negro and the desert tribes. Individually men of courage and successful in the military occupation of Ethiopia, favored by the political disintegration of Egypt, these Libyan chiefs gained the headship of the Nile valley, held it for about eighty years, and then went down to defeat before the invading Assyrians. Their losses in men, accumulated wealth, and pres-

²⁵ The origin of the story of Sethon, Sennacherib, and the field mice, related by Herodotus (*see* Griffith, *Stories of the High Priests of Memphis*, pp. 5-12), is a legitimate subject for investigation; but the statements contained in the story cannot at present be utilized for the examination of the question in hand.

tige in their ill-fated struggles with the Assyrians, perhaps also a degeneration of character in Tanutaman and Atlanersa, reduced them to inferiority to the king of Sais, Psammetik I, and they withdrew to Ethiopia, which Psammetik was not able to include in his kingdom. Thus Ethiopia, for centuries a province of Egypt and for eighty years the dominant province, was separated from the mother country under independent kings descended, at least at first, from those who had ruled Egypt. Tanutaman was succeeded by a king named Atlanersa, probably a son of Tirhakah.²⁶ He began a temple to Amon at Gebel Barkal, which we excavated in 1916, but he must have died unexpectedly. Only one room was completed and a beautiful granite altar set up in it; but the reliefs in that room and the front part of the temple were unfinished. Neither of the great granite statues intended to stand before the outer pylon was ever completed; one was found on its side in the debris before the temple, and the other is still lying in the quarry at Tombos. He was buried in a small tomb at Nuri (Pyr. XX), the second king's pyramid in that cemetery. It was his successor, Senkamanseken, who appears to have revived the fortunes of the family. He finished the temple of Atlanersa at Barkal, and placed at least three fine granite statues of himself in the Great Temple there (found by us in 1916). At Nuri he built the first of the large three-room stairway-pyramids (28 m. square), and his burial was carried out with great ostentation. His reign was marked by an accumulation of wealth and by the fact that his craftsmen participated in the development of the Egyptian renaissance. I refrain from giving the list of subsequent kings down to 300 B.C. or beyond, which we have recovered, inasmuch as the

²⁶ The pronunciation of these names of Ethiopian kings after Tanutaman is conjectural. The writing gives only the consonants. The forms I adopted in 1917 are merely pronounceable ones in which the original hieroglyphic forms may be recognized. My justification in rejecting forms based on the Meroitic now appears in the fact that the names are for the greater part of Libyan origin.

names would be meaningless to any one but a specialist in Egyptian history. Suffice it to say that Senkamanseken was followed by five kings whose scribes and craftsmen clung closely to the Egyptian traditions; but the fortunes of the last two of the five gradually declined. The next two dynasties, also buried at Nuri and therefore probably claiming descent from Tirhakah (by marriage?), present a progressive departure from the Egyptian traditions, and about 350-300 B.C. the degeneration had produced a curious Egypto-Ethiopian culture closely resembling the Meroitic. Long before 300 B.C. the Ethiopian kings, cut off from Egypt, had turned their attention to the South and had developed the country about Baru'a (supposed to be Meroë). In the time of Nastasan, the last king buried at Nuri, the political seat was at Baru'a, but Napata remained the religious capital, the place of coronation and burial. After Nastasan's death, the royal cemetery was opened at Meroë (Kabushiyah), and at that time the political capital probably became the seat of the chief temple and of the priestly hierarchy. In the first century B.C. either Napata became again the capital of Meroitic Ethiopia, or it was the seat of an independent kingdom of Napata, detached from the kingdom of Meroë. For during this century pyramids were again built at Napata, this time at Gebel Barkal (excavated by us in 1916), the Great Temple of Amon and that built by Atlanersa-Senkamanseken were restored, and numerous buildings, administrative and religious, were constructed for the first time. The Ethiopia or Cush known to the Greeks and Romans was that of the Meroitic kingdom, and the name "Ethiopia" was first given to Cush by them. In spite of the long accounts of the classical writers, the history of the Meroitic Kingdom is still in obscurity, and it is the hope of the Harvard-Boston expedition to continue its researches in Ethiopia by excavating the royal cemetery of Meroë.

PSYCHIC RESEARCH

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Psychic Research, "not to put too fine a point upon it," means for the most part thus far a careful and systematic investigation of the phenomena of spiritualism. A more elegant and reputable camouflage might be devised for it, and of course the name can be legitimately used to designate the study of many things with which spiritualism has nothing to do. But words have to be taken in the sense which common usage gives to them, and practically psychic research is the study of spiritualism. It used to be said by almost everybody, except the spiritualists, that the matter was not worth investigation; it was all an unwholesome mass of fraud, imposture, and delusion, to which no reasonable person would think for a moment of giving serious attention. Very likely a good many people are saying that still; but not if they have enough knowledge of the facts to serve as the basis of intelligent judgment. Whatever frauds may be practiced in the name of spiritualism, there are plenty of occurrences which no sane mind, having real knowledge of them, will attribute to that source.

It is more common now to hear these occurrences ascribed to telepathy, which is perhaps correct; though where that conclusion is most confidently stated there is probably least right to hold it. Of telepathy very little is yet known, and what has been proved would seem to indicate that it is a faculty of quite limited range and power. It cannot be invoked to explain the facts which spiritualism presents without extending its capacity enormously, far beyond anything that is known of it elsewhere. Possibly it has this greater gift; but that is something

which requires to be shown, not merely taken for granted. One can only jump to the conclusion that it has the gift; and this jump is often made, one must say, less for the sake of getting at the truth than for the purpose of getting rid of spiritualism. However, the investigation has now proceeded far enough so that we may intelligently state the issue to be, "spirits *versus* telepathy." Either there is some limited communication with personalities which have survived the change of death, or telepathy is a power of the mind possessing hitherto undreamed-of capacity.

The purpose of the present paper is abundantly fulfilled if it can be shown that this is the issue to which psychic research has brought us, and that however unable we may now be to demonstrate in favor of spirits, we are quite as far from being able to give the case to telepathy. Whether or not this is a matter which no one can ever find out, remains to be seen. At present not many have the means at hand for making a decision of that question. Some minds of first-rate ability in close contact with the investigation have given their verdict strongly and unhesitatingly in favor of spirits. The general public may be in a better, or worse, position for exercising a dispassionate judgment; but it has no right to deliver an opinion which would close the case. As the matter now stands, with what it now knows or what can be shown to it, this public cannot be fairly asked to accept the views, say of Sir Oliver Lodge. But neither has it any good right to say that he is altogether deluded and mistaken. So far as it has any right to judge, the case for telepathy is quite as dubious as that for spirits.

The heart of the problem which psychic research has attacked is the attempt to decide the real value of what purports to be evidence of the survival of personality after death. Its main task is the study of what is offered as proof of personal identity from a source beyond our

sight. Is one disqualified for that study when he admits the possibility of such survival? No more, certainly, than when he starts with a denial of such possibility. In truth, whatever may be its prepossessions, a candid mind ought to be able to deal fairly with what it finds. The demand on it in this case is that it shall concentrate its attention on this question of the sufficiency of the evidence for personal survival.

It is often said that the chief interest lies elsewhere. One hears people declare, for instance, that they will listen to what psychic research has to tell them when it can disclose something worth while about the nature and character of a future life, and not till then. But the first question is, Do spirits exist? Surely if an effort were made on the other side to communicate with us here, the first endeavor would be not to describe conditions there but to say, "This is So-and-so, whom you have formerly known. By such and such memories which we share in common you may know that I am speaking." In point of fact this is mostly the character which the spontaneous communications take. The first thing to do is to find out, if possible, whether this appearance of actual communication is true or false.

It may be said that if they who are, by hypothesis, trying to give assurance of their continued existence can furnish this, they ought to go on and satisfy our curiosity about many other things, and that their apparent inability to do this throws fatal discredit upon the whole manifestation. But that is a too hasty and superficial judgment. The means of transmission might suffice for the one thing and not for the other. If we consider presently what such a line of transmission may possibly be, this should be quite evident. Just here it cannot be said with too much emphasis that if there is anything of this sort to investigate, it is, first of all, the question of personal survival and personal identity. Do the supposed

communicators give sufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that they are real persons, and is the assertion that they are such more reasonable or more credible than other explanations of the origin of the communications ?

Probably all who have looked into this for themselves will agree that it is not a case for snap judgment, for or against. Questions of personal identity are generally apt to need rather careful handling. Everybody must know something of the way they are treated in our courts of law. What a long time it took, and what almost endless discussion, to dispose of the Tichborne case in England! Do such and such things prove, or do they not, that the claimant at bar is Roger Tichborne or Arthur Orton ? How this debate went on for days and weeks, and on what "trivialities" it mostly turned! The question in the case of psychic research is not unlike that.

First and last there is a very considerable amount of evidence in the literature of psychic research that is worth serious study. Unhappily, thus far it lies embedded in a mass of irrelevant matter, so that the search for it is like the quest for Gratiano's "two grains of wheat hid in two bushels of chaff." And when it is found everyone has to be his own lawyer in dealing with it. No one can doubt when he hits upon some of the more striking incidents in this literature that they do constitute evidence of something. But just what it is that they prove is likely to be, to the mind unskilled in the handling of such evidence, one of the most baffling questions it could take up. It is difficult to make any theory cover all the facts in the case. There is great need that someone should make a selection of what really has evidential value, and examine it with that critical skill which a good lawyer or a good judge brings to bear upon the evidence presented to a jury in court. A little of that has been done, but not very much; and if the investigation is to go on, it is a job that some competent person ought soon to tackle.

Suppose we glance for a moment at the method pursued in gathering this evidence, and at some of the difficulties of arriving at a satisfactory conclusion with regard to its meaning. Most investigations now make use of automatic writing, which is found on the whole to yield better results. This has the advantage of making an exact record of the alleged communications, and also it stops an immense amount of merely inconsequent talk; thus reducing the labor of separating from the flood of verbiage anything that seems to deserve further study. Now it is easy enough for anyone to write whatever comes into his head and call it "automatic." But whoever cares to look into the matter can soon satisfy himself that there is plenty of such writing in which the person who does it is not consciously responsible for what is written. Automatic writing, however it is to be explained, is an undoubted fact.

Mostly, when left to itself, that is to say when it is not guided by leading questions, this writing takes the form of an attempt to reveal and establish personal identity. It pretends to come from some person, no longer living in this world, who seeks to convey to those who are still in the flesh an assurance of his continued existence. Now and again what comes in this way is remarkably convincing. It really seems as if the person in question were close at hand, dictating the words that are being spoken or written. We are told, and no doubt with truth, that the best of this evidence does not get into print. It is too intimately personal to submit to public inspection. However, what is printed, if one will have the patience to fish for it in somewhat extensive seas of vapid talk, is often very good. But it comes only as it were in brief snatches, and is never long sustained. After a kind of sunburst of startling impersonation which fairly takes one's breath away, so realistic does it seem, the communications trail off into a sort of dream-like drivel, or even into mere stupid misstatement and gross fabrication.

Why is it then that these attempted impersonations are by fits and snatches so remarkably lifelike, and for the rest so wretchedly ineffective? If they are the mere masquerade of secondary personality, why this curious unevenness of quality, and where does the information come from on which the impersonation is based? Does it come from other adjacent minds through some process of telepathy? Perhaps so. But the telepathy which can get into the mind of an utter stranger and, with little delay, select out of a great store of memories covering many years a group of pertinent incidents connected with one single personality, is a somewhat staggering thing to think of. To go by the record, we are required to suppose that this telepathic faculty sometimes ignores altogether what is in the foreground of the consciousness it is exploring, and brings forth what turn out to be facts from a depth which conscious memory does not reach. Moreover, it has to be a telepathy that can work upon occasion across hundreds of miles of space. The writing has been known to use information that could not have been derived from any living person without going that far afield. No one is in position to say that this cannot be done; but really it sounds quite as incredible as any other hypothesis that can be offered.

Meanwhile, if we look a little closer at what assumes to be a line of communication between the living and the dead, though we may be unable to make a wholly satisfactory explanation on the supposition that this is real, we can get a little start toward some possible explanation. The common spiritualistic assumption has been that a spirit gets into or takes possession of a physical organism conveniently loaned for the purpose, and proceeds to write or talk through that organism in place of its real owner. No long or profound study is required to lead to the conclusion that this is not what generally takes place. Whatever comes from another world, provided anything

does come from that source, the spirit remains in some sense quite apart, and only sends what it can through what might be described as two different layers of consciousness, both of them, it would seem, in an abnormal and irresponsible state. The line of transmission, if such there be, lies through two independent mental strata, either of which is liable at any moment to begin talking on its own account.

First of all, we are dealing with the subconscious mind of the so-called medium. To all intents and purposes that is in a state of sleep, and not under the control of a conscious will. Most likely it is having a dream of its own, and anyone wanting to use it to transmit a message would have to get the message into and through that dream. And behind this subconscious mind there is very constantly, seemingly a vital part of the manifestation, what is called a "control." This purports to be a spirit in charge of the line of communication; and it so frequently intervenes with comment or explanation as to make us know that it is always there. We are given to understand that it takes from some communicator what he desires to send, and transfers this to the medium, who then delivers it to the person to whom it is addressed. Now this "control," almost certainly, is also more or less irresponsible, like the subconscious mind of the medium. If both are forms of secondary personality, they are alike incapable of distinguishing truth from fiction. If the control is a real spirit, very probably it has to put itself, in order to make a line through, into a condition like the medium's trance; which means that it also is in a somewhat dreamlike state.

Imagine then an intelligence like our own on the "other side" wishing to send some message through a channel like this. Obviously a task of no small size confronts it. Its one chance of success is so to get the attention of these two separate "streams of consciousness" that they will

suspend, or partially suspend, their own dreaming operations to repeat parrot-like what they are told to say. The message is nothing that concerns them, and they are apt to take no more than a languid interest in it. Even though they went to sleep with the fixed purpose of lending themselves to such a transfer of intelligence through them, being once asleep they might not much respect that purpose. They might listen carefully and report faithfully, or again they might not. In the latter case they would probably take up with and expound their own silly dream instead.

The conjecture that some such process as this is involved in the communications furnished by automatic writing is not here offered as answering to all the facts in the case; but it goes as far in that direction as one reader of this literature can get. It has to be acknowledged that, as thus described, it is an exceedingly fragile and uncertain line of transmission. Perhaps it is even less trustworthy than what has been already said would make it out to be. For there is reason to think that what comes is largely in the form of symbolic pictures, and that what is delivered is such an interpretation of these pictures as the subconscious mind of the medium can make. If the message were in words, names ought to come as easily as other parts of speech. But as a rule they do not; they occasion great difficulty; though curiously enough they are sometimes given with great ease, and again for no apparent reason cannot be had at all. But the dream-mind which assumes to be delivering the message always spends much time in describing what it sees; a kind of panoramic vision that is passing before its sight. It is possible that some communications which have been received with much ridicule, like that about the cigar factory in Sir Oliver Lodge's book, are due to the attempt to tell something, nobody knows just what, in this pictographic way.

It should be said also that though we have spoken of three separate entities, or quasi-entities, that enter into the manifestations—the communicator, the control, and the medium—the three often appear to be fused together in some inexplicable way, and it is all but impossible to tell which is for the moment on top. Altogether nobody can be much blamed for saying that it is sheer waste of time to fool with what is offered as a possible link between two worlds, if this is the best account of it that can be given. One can imagine that it might be genuine enough, as far as it goes, and that spirits might exist most plentifully at the other end, but would pay little attention to the means of communication because of the extreme uncertainty of being able to use it in any satisfactory way.

And yet a good many of us, as we go over the record, are again and again impressed with the strong probability that, wavering and unreliable as it may be, there is a fitful connection here and that something does get across. It would be foolish to expect very much. Of predictions about the future, for example, we could never be very sure just where they came from or what they were worth. Though we were entirely satisfied about their source, there is no reason to think that spirits with which we are likely to come into contact have much greater knowledge of coming events than we possess. Whatever descriptions may be attempted of the manner of life hereafter, there is no possible way by which we can check them up to determine their accuracy.

The one thing that we can hope to get from the connection, if it really exists, is some new ground for assurance of personal survival after death. This must come from the conviction that good evidence of personal identity has been submitted through the communications. Is there hope of getting evidence of that kind which would satisfy the majority of reasonable minds, and what would it be worth if we had it? One does not see that

the hope is extravagant or absurd. Poor as the instrument is with which psychic research works, it perhaps suffices as well as did the earliest devices for the transmission of sounds by means of electricity. Possibly with further experiment this instrument may be improved.

Those who are closest to the investigation are just as sure that the possibility of intelligent communication has been established as were the men who worked so long on the invention of the telegraph and the telephone. They may be entirely mistaken; but, on the other hand, the people who are sure that there is "nothing in it" appear to base their certainty on *a priori* grounds, which in like case have often proved untenable. Many a quest has been ardently followed with less promise of ultimate success to support it; and it is not probable that the scornful indifference of "orthodox" science will be able to smother this.

If it should turn out that evidence which compels the world's attention and assent can be thus gathered, what would that be worth? At this moment we are much in the mood to say that materialism is not a good word to conjure with. We are not disposed to place reliance on the fruits of a purely materialistic civilization. But can we get what we want out of an idealism which, when all is said and done, is a kind of sunset effect, a painting of attractive possibilities on mists and clouds? Does it not all come down at last to the question, "If a man die, shall he live again?" With the assurance that our personal existence is to be carried forward into another state of being, we seem to have a hold upon idealism and a defense against materialism that can be gained in no other way.

Probably in any event there is not much reason to fear actual extinction of the belief in immortality. But can those who cherish that belief afford to neglect or despise any means of strengthening assurance in the common mind? If psychic research can ever do for the many

what it has done for a few, it has a very important part to play in building up the higher life of the future. This appears to be so plain that one must think the prejudice against it is based, more than anything else, on the fear of its failure. No poverty is quite so bad as that which follows the break-down of plans for the sudden acquisition of great wealth.

This risk certainly has to be reckoned with. Yet the prejudice might be moderated to a reasonable caution. It is not as if we were staking our whole fortune on this one cast. May we not profitably remember the proverb, "Nothing venture, nothing win?" When we consider the changes which the increase of scientific training and the growth of a scientific temper are likely to make in the minds of men, it is evident that there would be much advantage in the possession of something like scientific evidence of the reality of the future life. The promoters of psychic research are quite confident that such evidence, good enough for anybody, is attainable. They may be too sanguine about this; promoters often are. But then again some of us may wonder in days to come why we did not make an earlier investment in an undertaking whose promise we were too slow to see. It is not quite clear yet who the fools in this case really are, and it is as well perhaps to be a little frugal in the use of that epithet.

TWO CONTRASTING ATTITUDES TOWARDS EVIL

RUTH MANNING GORDON

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The problem of evil is nearly as old as philosophy itself. At present, however, it is occupying a very prominent place in philosophic thought, perhaps because the horrors of the great war and the unsettled social conditions have brought home to us with added emphasis the evil in the world, and have upset some of our theories of the even tenor and progress of mankind.

Leaving aside the theological question as to how evil can be reconciled with a benevolent Deity, the problem is this: We find our world a mixture of good and evil. This evil appears in various forms. According to the classification used by Professor Hocking there is, first, physical evil: pain, accident, misfortune; secondly, the quasi-physical: inequality, limitation, and the result of the evil of others; thirdly, the reflective evils: cynicism, and alienation from the world; fourthly, moral evil, or sin; and finally, death — of our plans and aspirations, as well as of the body.

Now can we look forward with the hope that the good may sometime triumph and the evil be eradicated, or is evil an eternal element and an indispensable one in the constitution of the universe? As one idealist has stated it, the question is, "Whether the arduous and heroic life with the conditions, that is, the pain and the evil which evoke heroism, is worth while, enduringly and for its own sake, or whether morality is worth while only on the prospect of the final eradication of evil and therefore the abolition of morality itself."¹ These two ways of looking at

¹ R. F. A. Hoernlé, *Neo-Realism and Religion*, *Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. XI, April, 1918.

evil are represented in philosophy by the two opposing views, respectively, of realism and idealism.

I

As a matter of fact, the name "*Idealism*" is misleading, since we associate that term with the possession of ideals. The theory called "idealism," however, is no more idealistic in this sense than realism — the names being more appropriate to the epistemological side of the theories than to their moral spheres. For in the realm of morality, as has been quite rightly pointed out, it is realism which is idealistic, and idealism which is realistic.²

Idealism has been, and still is, to a large extent, the dominant philosophy in the universities of America and Great Britain, and has a strong popular hold from the fact that it stands as the champion of religion, opposed to naturalism. It traces back its lineage to Kant, Fichte, and Hegel; it was transferred to Great Britain in the last century, and there represented by such men as T. H. Green, the Cairds, F. H. Bradley, and Bosanquet, and in this country by Royce.

There is a quite natural antipathy, at present, to things German, and idealism has been looked upon with disfavor because of its origin — "*Timeo Danaos . . . !*" At the same time, we ought to remember the value of idealism and its important place in the history of thought. And whatever we think of it as a theory, let us judge it on its merits alone, and not on its pedigree.

Idealism is the theory which believes the universe to be spiritual — "the actual embodiment of the highest values, as witnessed by the spiritual forms of experience." There are two forms of idealism: first, personal idealism, which means by mind the *individual* mind, and which regards God as a greater Mind; a Moral Power, but limited.

² R. F. A. Hoernlé, Neo-Realism and Religion, *Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. XI, April, 1918.

In other words, personal idealism is willing to sacrifice the omnipotence of God to His benevolence, and with its emphasis on the latter, is very near to pragmatism and realism, in the moral and religious sphere. The question in regard to personal idealism is whether this attitude is consistent with its idealism, which is a problem beyond the scope of this paper.

Secondly, there is absolute, or objective, idealism, which holds that the source of nature is one great Mind, the absolute, of which the universe is the expression. Man is the microcosm of the absolute, and through the knowledge of the individual soul the absolute reproduces itself:

“It would seem that the attainment of the knowledge [of the system of related facts] is only explicable as a reproduction of itself in the human soul by the consciousness for which the cosmos of related facts exists—a reproduction of itself, in which it uses the sentient life of the soul as its organ.”³

Man, through rational thought—when he can say, as one idealist has it, “Not I that think but the universe that thinks in me”—comes into touch with the absolute. Or again, through religious experience, the individual can be united with the absolute Spirit. From such a standpoint he can see the world as it really is—the reality instead of mere appearances. He finds that as a whole, the universe is perfect, despite, or rather, through the instrumentality of, the parts, which in their severality appear imperfect; he sees that what has seemed evil is, after all, good, or has a value, and therefore is a necessary and permanent element in the constitution of the whole.

Religion, for idealism, *transcends* morality; not in the sense that it omits it; it includes it. But it is a higher standpoint than that of “mere morality.” Through religion the idealist sees the necessity for, and the value of, morality in the world of experience.

³ T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Book I, Chap. II, § 71.

The cardinal principle, therefore, of absolute idealism in regard to the problem of evil is *Perfectionism*: that the universe is perfect as it is, since the evil is necessary for morality; and that the evil, therefore, cannot be eradicated.

In examining the arguments which idealism uses to prove this, we find that they fall into four classes: the psychological, ethical, metaphysical, and theological.

First, as to the psychological argument, some idealists find that there is, as they put it, a "craving for pain;" that such a thing as the "enjoyment of pain" may exist. Now outside of some pathological institution it would seem totally impossible to find anyone who really *craves* pain. Those who have ever had any experience with suffering realize the absurdity of such a suggestion. A person in agony with sciatica, neuritis, or even that common woe, toothache, will hardly say that he is enjoying it.

However, Professor Hocking notes that early man "knew how the frenzy of religious ecstasy made mutilation not only endurable but even necessary to give grist to the exhilaration that stormed within him. . . . Inhabitants of Greenland and Labrador do not leave their difficult countries, though they might; and seamen return to the hardships of the sea with an unbreakable attachment which is no mere habit."⁴ He refers to James's essay, "Is Life Worth Living?" in which James shows that "sufferings do not . . . abate the love of life; they seem to give it a keener zest."⁵ It has been suggested also that children seem to delight in certain painful acts, such as running pins into themselves. Moreover, most of us have met that strange variety of invalid who "enjoys poor health."

⁴ W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 220.

⁵ William James, *The Will to Believe*, p. 47.

How then can we explain these cases except by the assumption of a craving for pain? I think Professor Hocking puts us on the right track when he says that we long for "reality" and we find this in pain. This shows that it is not the pain which we crave, but that the pain is only a means to an end. In other words, pain is not valuable in itself. Early man considered mutilation a necessary part of religion, just as certain primitive sects, as, for instance, the Druids, thought human sacrifice necessary. The point is not that they themselves enjoyed the suffering, but that they thought such action pleasing to their gods.

As to the Labradorians and the Greenlanders, there seem to be several elements in their case. First of all, there is the tremendous tie of one's native land, the country where one was born and one's ancestors have lived. Secondly, although, as we have seen, Professor Hocking says this attachment is "no mere habit,"⁶ habit seems to play an important part. The Greenlanders always have lived there; any other country would seem strange and uncomfortable, just as visiting in a palace is uncomfortable to some of us, because it is unaccustomed. It is not that anyone prefers hardships, but rather that what are luxuries to some, to others, particularly to those to whom they are new, are actually discomforts. This applies also to the seamen. In a terrific storm at sea a certain sailor said to his comrade, "Say, Bill, ain't we lucky not to be on shore. Think how the shingles must be flying on a night like this!"

Finally, for all these cases there is the love of the atmosphere of adventure and of excitement. This is by no means the same as the enjoyment of pain. When we analyze it, we find it to be quite the opposite. The lover of danger hopes that in the course of his wanderings or his difficulties he will have some thrilling experience, that

⁶ See above, p. 59.

romance is lying in wait for him, with a rôle for him to play, perhaps that of hero.

With children it is not the self-inflicted pain which they enjoy; it is the pride in their own bravery and self-control which they like. So with the invalid who delights in being ill. It is the gifts, the sympathy, particularly, the attention of his friends, that he craves.

All these examples, therefore, show that there are values which are so dear to us that we are willing to endure pain to get them, perhaps even to sacrifice life itself for them, and these ends can range from devotion to a cause, like that of the Waldensians, whom James cites, to the admiration or attention craved by the plain egoist. Whether one can join all these values together under the name of "reality" and say that is what we crave, is a very different question, and one which would involve much metaphysical discussion.

The question would yet remain, whether pain would still be necessary in the world as a *means*. This brings us to what might be called the ethical argument and the one which is perhaps the most popular. According to this, pain and also the other forms of evil are necessary in the constitution of the universe, since without them we could not become virtuous. We need to struggle, and hence we must have something which resists us to provide a hostile environment. This we find to be evil, and we see that evil comes to have a value, since it is indispensable to morality, to prevent moral atrophy. Also, we are told that we get a certain solidarity from fighting evil. The common burden binds men together, as we see in any time of calamity, as, for instance, the Halifax disaster or the wreck of the Titanic. Eradicate evil as a force which must be fought and you will at the same time destroy the very good which you are trying to bring to victory. For virtue and evil are indissolubly joined together, in that it is only in the fight against evil that virtue exists.

But why does the idealist anticipate moral atrophy if evil were finally eradicated and therefore the struggle? We do not say that a man who has no craving for drink is "morally atrophied" or is devoid of morality in comparison to the man who has to fight to overcome his natural desires. We may admire the latter's will power, but we should hesitate to say that he is more highly developed mentally and spiritually.

In this war we have found among the gallant men and women of the Allies and from our own country that certain virtues have been heightened — courage, chivalry, high-mindedness, self-sacrifice, and a host of others. Shall we hope for a perpetuation of war on this account? No; because the qualities which we admire in these men and women spring not from war, which is in itself evil, but from the very fact that they are fighting against war for the purpose of bettering the world.

The fact that good may, and often does, come out of evil at the present state of world development does not prove that evil is therefore a necessary element in the universe for all time. As Professor Perry says, "Circumstances that press life forward will be left behind, if these circumstances are not themselves good."⁷

This argument is really derived from the more important Hegelian doctrine of the perfection of the whole, which forms the metaphysical argument. The universe, as we have seen, is a totality and is *perfect as it is*. This does not mean that it is a Utopia, but that it is perfect because of the evil in it. Destroy evil — not the individual evils, but evil itself — and you would have an imperfect universe, because you would lose all positive values as well. As we look at facts in their severality, we see misery and wickedness, but when we take the attitude of the whole, the "beyond-good-and-evil standpoint," we no longer see these facts blindly, but with an

⁷ R. B. Perry, *The Moral Economy*, p. 26.

understanding of their value and their meaning in relation to the whole. "Hence," says Royce, "the deepest assertion of idealism is not that above all the evil powers in the world there is at work some good power mightier than they, but rather that through all the powers, good and evil, and in them all, dwells the higher spirit that does not so much create as constitute them what they are, and so include them all."⁸

This is the religious attitude, but it is an attitude which prevents "morality from being meaningless," since it includes the latter with its struggle as essential. Evil, therefore, becomes an incident in the whole, and the individual who has taken the attitude of the whole is able to "transmute it."

Of course, the obvious objection to this is that the result of an evil-plus-good mixture, as this transmutation would have to be, cannot be called *good*, in our use of the term, without equivocation,⁹ any more than a cat which is part Persian and part plain cat can be classed as a Persian cat.

But there is another side to this theory of evil as an incident. "Memory," says one idealist, "puts a frame about evil and changes it" — "*Hæc olim meminisse juvabit*" — but as one of the poets quaintly remarks, "Perhaps it may not be pleasant a bit." Memory has not put a frame about the Spanish Inquisition, or the massacre of St. Bartholomew, or the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and changed them. There are things in the history of the world which stand out as simple horrors over which men will always shudder as they recall them.

The trouble is that the idealist, in looking at the history of the world, because of his premise of the absolute unity, has to attempt a justification of such deeds. As Professor Hocking puts it, "One must even be able to look

⁸ Josiah Royce, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 335.

⁹ R. B. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 180-183.

backward without a shudder.”¹⁰ In other words, he must find not only a scientific explanation of the facts, but a purpose behind these facts.

This brings us to the theological arguments: We are told that there are two kinds of evil in the world, that which we can help and therefore which we must fight — “our job” — and that which we cannot help, which is “God’s job.” This would seem to be an aid to us in looking at history and also in facing life, until we reflect that the whole point hinges on the nice line of distinction between “our job” and “God’s job.” How are we to decide between the two varieties? This would soon prove a dangerous way of shifting responsibility.

Evil in the last resort, we are told, drives the mind to God. It is the “weapon which God uses to drive us to Himself;” because God understands evil, and if we come to see evil through the mind of God, we find it changes its character. To the ordinary theist, to say nothing of the philosophers of other schools, such a statement appears little short of blasphemous. What a conception of God that leaves in one’s mind! One is involuntarily reminded of that delightful sailor minister, Father Taylor, who said to a certain preacher, “Your God is my Devil.” “If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father who is in heaven give good things to them that ask Him” does not tally with the conception of a God who invented the agonies of the world as a particularly clever instrument of torture to drive human beings to Him.

Again, how about the terrible suffering among dumb animals? How is that to be explained?

Let us hope that Xenophanes is not right in his explanation of the derivation of the conception of God.

¹⁰ W. E. Hocking, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

II

Realism is a comparative stranger in the philosophic world and cannot boast of so famous a lineage as idealism. We have been told by some that realism is the direct descendant of English empiricism; but in this country, at least, it is more closely connected on the metaphysical and epistemological sides with the radical empiricism urged by William James. To give an adequate presentation of its technical doctrines or of the differences between the English and American realists would be impossible for us, since we must spend our time on its moral and religious side; but we should remember that realism, in contrast to the monism of idealism, believes the universe is pluralistic, and that it is plastic and hence "perfectible," rather than the ordered externalizing of the absolute Mind which is perfect.

Realists, unlike idealists, have as yet given little of their attention to the problems of the spirit, with the exception in America of R. B. Perry. They have confined themselves to a "scientific review of the universe." As a matter of fact, Professor Perry's moral and religious philosophy seems a direct descendant of William James's pragmatism. We find the same burning dissatisfaction with things as they are, the sympathy for the tragedy in the world, and the optimistic faith and enthusiastic determination that the universe can be bettered through human action.

For the realist religion is not a different point of view from that of morality. It is the consummation of the latter; it is a religion for the "tough-minded," as James would say, not a panacea to lull one to rest, or a stoical resignation to fate, but a call to the pioneering spirit to action. Perhaps it is this very characteristic of neo-realism which makes it so alluring to the younger students, especially to the youth of such a time as the present.

The cardinal moral doctrine of realism, as we have seen, is meliorism, or the theory that the world can be made better; that the evil can be eliminated. How then does realism seek to prove that this is possible?

What would seem to be realism's most important argument is derived, as is that of idealism, from its metaphysics. It is a pluralistic theory of the universe; we are not dealing with a "block universe;" hence, not all the elements or parts are valuable. Evil is not the condition of virtue; it does not partake of the same essence. It is possible, therefore, to eliminate the parts which are valueless without completely destroying our scheme, as would happen to monism. We can quite ruthlessly set to work to destroy the evil in the universe without feeling that we are interfering with the Absolute or upsetting the universe.

Secondly, realism insists that evil is not indispensable to virtue; that we must distinguish carefully between good and evil and not confuse the two and make good equivocal. As we have said, the realist admits that under present conditions good may come out of evil, but he emphatically denies that this fact in any way changes the character of evil, or that the two are therefore necessarily indissoluble. "It would be as reasonable . . . to argue that because a man may be lifted from the mire, therefore mire is essentially that from which a man may be lifted, and hence, a condition of the higher life."¹¹

Again, the realist has said that we must separate the two forms of knowledge—theory and belief—in order that they may work amicably together. "Theory should enlighten belief and belief strengthen theory."¹² Faith, he tells us, is the especial domain of religion. Now the realist finds that this faith in the perfection of the universe is necessary as a working hypothesis. It is necessary for life.

¹¹ R. B. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 247.

¹² R. B. Perry, *op. cit.*

This is strengthened by psychological facts. Can you ever make an army fight by trying to convince the men that they never can win? It is psychologically impossible. Our army officials knew this and they begged the people at home to write more encouraging letters. Virgil knew this: "*Possunt quia posse videntur.*"

Again, it is impossible to fight adequately if one takes too friendly an attitude toward one's opponent. After all, the fight against evil is not a tennis game, which merely gives us exercise and in which we are grateful to have a friend who will play opposite us. It is a grim business, in which we are fighting not a fellow human being, but a deadly force.

The realist feels that the only justification of his fight is that he is trying to make conditions better for those who come after, that is, helping to better the world. As Professor Dickinson Miller says of the heroes in the war, "They are not facing agony for the sake of facing it, but solely in order that other lives may be spared the agony that they bear."¹³

Again, the realist has infinite faith in the plasticity of his environment. The "cosmological proof [of moral idealism] lies in the moral fruitfulness and plasticity of nature."¹⁴ It believes, with pragmatism, that "through the knowledge that is power, and guided by his desire and hope of better things, man may conquer nature and subdue the insurrection of evil."¹⁵

But does the realist find any justification for this faith that nature may be transformed? I think that he can point to scientific and moral progress. No one, I think, would deny the importance of the scientific achievements, especially in the past one hundred years. But we are told by certain of the idealists that there really is no such

¹³ Dickinson Miller, *The Problem of Evil in the Present State of the World*, *Anglican Theological Review*, Vol. I, No. 1.

¹⁴ R. B. Perry, *The Moral Economy*, p. 252.

¹⁵ R. B. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 268.

thing as progress. Life has simply become more complicated. The cave-man lived up to his ideals just as well, since they were easier, as we do to ours. The standards have changed, but not mankind. Even granting this much, however, if the same percentage, or a smaller, even approximated the higher ideals, the world would be just so much the better. It is true that few persons live up to the highest ideals of today; but few belong to the cave-man age, and the average is obviously better. A hundred years ago a boy was hanged in London for breaking into a candy shop, and another boy was hanged in the square at Aberdeen, by order of the Duke, for stealing a sheep.

Again, who makes the standards? Are they arbitrary rules imposed from without? Has the individual nothing to do with the shaping of these standards? To the realist it seems that these standards belong to the individual, are just as much a part of his evolution as is his ability to stand erect. The very fact that he has better standards to which he is trying to live up shows his improvement.

During the war the pessimists were all most eager to point out that civilization was "going under" and that we had "slipped back." But was there ever a greater example of moral force than when nations joined together to destroy the idea that ruthless strength is the greatest aim, that the weak should be exterminated, and that war is a necessary and desirable thing? When men have given their lives not for gain or conquest but that the ideals of freedom, democracy, and humanity might live, I think we can safely say that we have progressed somewhat.

But the idealist objects to all this in that it is quantitative. The realist, he argues, thinks that evil is something at which we can keep nibbling until finally it is all gone; whereas, it is a quality; it is of the essence of the universe, and can never be eliminated, especially in this piecemeal fashion.

Now it is quite true that the realist does look at evil quantitatively. He is saved from the qualitative dilemma by his pluralistic universe. He has no trouble in getting rid of the evil, because it is not of the same essence as good. When he has finally succeeded in conquering an individual evil, he has eliminated just that much evil from the world. He does not have to reflect with Bosanquet, that "the stuff of which evil is made is one with the stuff of which good is made;"¹⁶ that he really has not touched the roots of the matter, and that it will manifest itself again.

But there is another objection to realism's attitude: "Why so hot, little man?" we are asked. Religion is something other than grubbing. We must turn away from the "gospel of service," from mere morality, which Bosanquet tells us is "fashionless," and look at the world *sub specie æternitatis*. This attitude of realism keeps us tied down to the fight; it prevents us from becoming serene. Now there is just a grain of truth in this criticism, namely, that service must not become mechanical, if it is to be valuable; but I think the realist would agree to this quite as readily as the idealist.

Professor Hocking tells us the act of giving a cup of cold water is not in itself religious. It is only when the cup of cold water is given "in His name." In this connection it is interesting to note that in Matthew 25, in the description of the Last Judgment, the King says to the blessed ones who are to inherit the kingdom, "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me," without any idea of the necessity of its being done "in His name." Whereas, in Matthew 7 we find, "Therefore by their fruits ye shall know them. . . . Many will say to me in that day, Lord, Lord, did we not prophesy by thy name, and by thy name cast out demons, and by thy name do many mighty

¹⁶ Bernard Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 215.

works ? And then will I profess unto them, I never knew you. Depart from me, ye that work iniquity."

Finally, we are told that we should not want a world without evil in it; it would be too placid, too colorless. Such a world, according to Professor Hocking, "might provide a type of happiness bovine or angelic, but certainly not human."¹⁷ James's famous Chautauqua description has been cited by Bosanquet¹⁸ and by Professor Hoernlé,¹⁹ who try to prove to us that one of the most famous of meliorists has gone back on his own theory.

But why was the Chautauqua community so unbearable to James ? The whole point is that under present conditions such a community is smug and unreal; it is out of touch with the tragedy of the world *as it is*. No person in his right mind really prefers dirt, squalor, "battle, murder, and sudden death" to beauty, freedom, and peace. He may be, and if he is a meliorist he must be, happier now fighting the former than placidly enjoying the latter, but this is only because he has a guilty sense if he is high-minded; he knows that he is a "slacker," if he is not helping to put more of the valuable things into the world, or helping others to reach them, or rooting up that which chokes them. Those who are doing the real fighting against evil — social workers, doctors, nurses, missionaries — are all upheld by their faith that they are contributing their part, however small, to the improvement of the world and the betterment of their fellowmen. They probably are improved by their struggle, too, but that is not their main purpose in life.

Of course, it is impossible to speculate on what the world would be like without evil. We have been presented with all varieties of pictures, from the harps-crowns-golden-streets theories to those of socialistic com-

¹⁷ W. E. Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, p. 217.

¹⁸ Bernard Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 332 ff.

¹⁹ R. F. A. Hoernlé, *op. cit.*

munities, according to the type of the imagination and the beliefs of the narrators. It is equally foolish, at the present state of the world, to argue as to what will be left to do when the world shall have been made perfect. The meliorist does not seek to switch away evil suddenly by a wave of a magic wand, as the idealist seems to think he means, and to have people of just the same development as the present transported to a "Golden Age," an earthly paradise existence;²⁰ rather, he believes that perfection is something which must be won through ages of labor and the united efforts of mankind.

If, on the other hand, evil is the "valuable" possession which the idealist insists, the logical thing would be to give everyone as much of it as possible and so provide every opportunity for improvement. While it may be said that this providing of evil can safely be left to the universe, would it not be still better to assist the universe? "Double, double, toil and trouble." A doctor trying to cure a man who would have been a cripple might well pause, on idealistic principles, to consider whether the man might not make more of himself if he were left to suffer. The realist, who would be trying simply to alleviate suffering, would not be troubled by any such nice point. For the idealist, the benevolent, altruistic thing for one to do would be to go about not "doing good," but making it as hard as possible for his neighbor, who, of course, would reciprocate quickly, so that there might be enough trouble for the improvement of all.

"It would be natural, but still perverse," says Professor Hocking, "to infer from this psychological truth [that we do not desire a world free from evil] the desirableness of preserving or courting or importing a degree of evil . . . [but] no war can act as such a remedy unless it is *just*; and no war is just unless it is inevitable."²¹ In

²⁰ Bernard Bosanquet, *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, pp. 93 ff.

²¹ W. E. Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, p. 217. (*Italics mine.*)

other words, Professor Hocking would have us believe that evil can be divided into two classes: the good evil and the bad evil! Instead of helping, this merely complicates matters, by leading us into equivocation.

III

Such then, are our two theories, roughly sketched. To what conclusion can we come regarding what they offer us? Let us first see what is the outcome of idealism's theory. Having found that the world is perfect because of the evil in it, there are two courses open to the idealist: The first is to adopt a *laissez faire* attitude; to ignore evil. The second is to fight, even though there is no hope of winning, because it brings out the best in us. The former is the more dangerous, but is perhaps more consistent with the idealist's theory of the universe, and avoids the paradox of fighting whole-heartedly against what one knows cannot be destroyed. This type of idealism has a great deal in common with mysticism and is almost oriental in its attitude. Having gained the knowledge that evil is necessary for the universe, we become more than critics and become serene. We arrive at that stage of which the hymn tells us:

“Content to let the world go by,
To know no gain nor loss.”

Professor Hocking expresses this standpoint when he says: “It [reality] must yield us the idea which unites what we most deeply desire with what is.”²² Now when we say that we are in danger of one of two results: Either we must overlook facts as they are, or we have got to content ourselves with low standards. We must either wear rose-colored glasses as we look out on the blackness of the world, or we must be very easily satisfied. We have confused the actual with the ideal.

²² W. E. Hocking, *Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 436.

Again, we find that we are to overcome evil by ignoring it, by "working out the good by over-attention to it and under-attention to its opposite;"²³ or, as Bosanquet — who, however, belongs more to the second group of idealists — says: "The secret of overcoming it [evil] is to feel that it is overcome and to treat it practically as a conquered thing."²⁴ This is a sort of inspired Christian Science. Just think you have cured your disease, and, presto! it is accomplished. This type of idealist seems to forget that there is such a thing as a divine unrest. Serenity is not enough as a *summum bonum*, and one may wonder whether this peaceful state of mind may not be merely the result of a phlegmatic temperament and a disregard of one's neighbor's woes. Dr. Walton in his delightful little book, *Why Worry?*, tells us that when we see any accident or misfortune, we should always say to ourselves, "Never touched me!" This type of idealist seems to adopt this motto.

Bosanquet and his followers best represent the second type of idealist. "It is part of the paradox of our finite-infinite being," he says, "that we are bound to maintain the combat against evil, and no doubt in a great degree against pain, not merely without anticipating, but even without whole-heartedly desiring, their entire abolition in every possible shape with all their occasions and accessories."²⁵ Or again: "Another prejudice," he tells us, "is that justice, the equal dealing with individuals, is an ultimate law of things. Plainly it is not so."²⁶

Evil, we are told, is like the dust which we sweep away one day only to have it return the next — "there must needs be offences."

Now we cannot but admire the courage which keeps these men striving against the impossible, like Tantalus

²³ W. E. Hocking, *Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 176.

²⁴ Bernard Bosanquet, *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, p. 104.

²⁵ Bernard Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 179.

²⁶ Bernard Bosanquet, *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, p. 117.

or Sisyphus, or King Canute when he ordered the sea to be lashed with whips.

But why must we fight? "The only question worth asking and answering in this matter is, What kind of a life, and under what conditions, is fundamentally most worth while as enabling us to make the most of ourselves — life in this actual world of ours, with its suffering and evil, or life, as the meliorist's fancy paints it, in a world without either?"²⁷

The world, therefore, becomes a sort of moral gymnasium, with evil as the indestructible punching bag for the development of our moral muscles. It is not that my purpose is to do my share in improving the world, but that the world exists for the purpose of improving ME. Now there is no more dangerous, more subtle, form of egoism than just this. We can see it in that poem of T. E. Brown called "Pain:"

"The man that hath great griefs I pity not;
 'Tis something to be great
 In anywise, and hint the larger state
 Though but in shadow of a shade, God wot!"²⁸

And we think of Milton's

"Fame, . . . that last infirmity of noble mind."

Strangely enough, the person who consciously aims at the improvement of himself as an exclusive end usually fails. The whole value of "self-realization" depends on what is meant by "self" and "realization." In itself, the term is nothing but an empty shell which can be loaded according to the desire of its creator.

But both forms of idealists tell us that their view of the perfection of the universe is taken from a "beyond-good-and-evil standpoint." Phrases like this and "God as moral and a-moral," and countless other such, may

²⁷ R. F. A. Hoernlé, *op. cit.*

²⁸ Quoted by Bernard Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 161.

have a meaning for mystics, but for the ordinary mortal they smack of Bacon's *Idols of the Forum* and of equivocation. For good and evil we have actual "sense-data," as Kant would say, and therefore they are real, and we can argue about them; but no human being can honestly know what "beyond good and evil" means; it exists only in that No Man's Land of the imagination where dwell the Purple Cow and the Dodo Bird, and an argument concerning it would be just as valuable as it would about the other two. When the idealist retires to this nebulous region, it is quite impossible to argue with him; but his superior manner towards the "stupidity" ²⁹ of his opponents is extremely irritating, and we are strongly reminded of Aristotle's *μεγαλόψυχος*.³⁰

Idealism, in short, leaves us with a God which we as moral beings find it difficult to worship, and with a universe in which we must, through mystical experience, rise to a "beyond-good-and-evil standpoint" if we are to attain peace of mind or if we are to continue the struggle. Its greatest faults are that it would tend either to indifference — if we are to ignore evil in the "transmutation" process — or egoism, if we are to use the evil to benefit ourselves, and that the natural esoteric quality of its religious experience leads it to be undemocratic.

What has realism to offer us? To be sure, realism, unlike idealism, is not a complete system. It is still in its constructive stage; it is blazing its trail. But this much I think we can say: First, realism gives us a universe in which man may strive hopefully. It scorns the use of mystical experience as a way of escape from the evil around us. It saves the heart of humanity from despair. It recognizes and emphasizes individualism — the power of the individual mind acting on the environ-

²⁹ Bernard Bosanquet, *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, p. 179.

³⁰ Nicomachean Ethics, Book IV, Chap. 3, p. 22: "ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως (δοξάζει καταφρονεῖ γὰρ ἀληθῶς) οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντας."

ment. As the carpenter said to James: "There is very little difference between one man and another, but what little there is *is very important*;"³¹ and realism believes that this difference is good for the world. We need the varied ideas and efforts of all these individuals.

Again, realism is democratic. It does not hold that the right attitude toward the world is open only to those who have had or can have the mystical experience. It is open to all who are willing to fight "the beautiful fight," and it holds out to them, through faith, the prophetic vision of victory.

Secondly, it gives a moral God, instead of the Absolute of idealism who remains "above the contrasts of good and evil;"³² and it insists on a religious dualism, God being a power other than ourselves, not a comprehensive totality.

Professor Perry's definitions of God seem rather vague and unsatisfactory: "God is neither an entity nor an ideal, but always a relation of entity to ideal."³³ Or, again: "My God is my world practically recognized in respect of its fundamental or ultimate attitude to my ideals. In this sense then, conveyed by this term *attitude*, my God will invariably possess the characters of personality."³⁴

James has perhaps best expressed the melioristic idea of God. "First it is essential," he says, "that God be conceived as the deepest power in the universe; and second, he must be conceived under the form of a mental personality . . . a power not ourselves then, which not only makes for righteousness, but means it, and which recognizes us."³⁵

³¹ William James, *The Will to Believe*, pp. 256, 257.

³² W. E. Hocking, *Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 332.

³³ R. B. Perry, *The Approach to Philosophy*, p. 87.

³⁴ R. B. Perry, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

³⁵ William James, *The Will to Believe*, p. 122.

Such an idea of God has been recently popularized through H. G. Wells's *God the Invisible King*. This God, who is striving against evil — or, as Mr. Wells has it, that fights for “the great attainment,” which is “the conquest of death,”³⁶ is a God who works — “My father worketh hitherto and I work.” Man becomes the co-worker with God in the enterprise of transforming nature. He meets God in the field of human endeavor, rather than when he has retired to the beyond-good-and-evil region.

But is this enough for religion? Professor Hoernlé tells us that Perry's religion with its “zeal for progress in human welfare, for rendering service to the cause of reform, for fighting against evil in all its guises, is clearly something without which religion would be poor and ineffective.” But this is not religion, because it is only a “cosmology and ethics, welded together from a biological point of view”;³⁷ it ignores mysticism.

Now mysticism should be recognized as a variety of religious experience, if one is to have religious toleration; and realism, if it is true to its ideals of democracy and individuality, will not seek to exclude the mystics; but for the same reason, realism finds it hard to tolerate statements claiming that mysticism is “the intensest and purest form of religion,” or that mystical experience is “the most characteristic and revealing variety of all [religious] experience.”³⁸

Let us have all the light which the mystics can bring to us, but let us protest when they insist that theirs is the only true light, or when they try to impose their experience on their less fortunate brothers. The term “religion” should be broad enough to include all varieties of religious experience — and who shall say which the “key-note” is?

³⁶ H. G. Wells, *God the Invisible King*, p. 99. (Quoted by R. B. Perry, *The Conflict of Ideals*, p. 329.)

³⁷ R. F. A. Hoernlé, *op. cit.*

³⁸ R. F. A. Hoernlé, *op. cit.*

For realism, religion is the consummation of morality; the lifting of service into the light of a great ideal, into fellowship with God with whom we become co-workers. It is a way of life which appeals to those who wish to "play a man's part and fulfil a man's destiny," but it adds to this struggle the vision of hope, the light of victory, the faith in the unconquerable power of good.

It is said that Leibnitz thought he had invented a "universal characteristic" which he hoped would bring a solution of all problems and an end to all disputes. "If controversies were to arise," he says, "there would be no more need of disputation than between two accountants, for it would suffice to take their pens in their hands and to sit down to their desks and to say to each other (with a friend as witness, if they like) 'Let us calculate.'"³⁹

Unfortunately, this happy day has not yet dawned, and realism and idealism cannot yet calculate on the problem of evil in this mechanical way. They can only theorize from experience, and wait. For after all, realism and idealism are two states of mind, and only time can prove which is right. Meanwhile, the realist, in his belief that the elimination of evil from the world is not a forlorn hope, proposes to struggle onward towards his ideal, with a faith and "a determination that through enlightened action things shall in time come to be what they should be."

³⁹ Quoted by Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, Chap. V.

BOOK REVIEWS

ALTRUISM. ITS NATURE AND VARIETIES. The Ely Lectures for 1917-18. GEORGE HERBERT PALMER. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1919. Pp. x, 138. \$1.25.

This little book is Professor Palmer at his best. One is justified in saying that it *is* Professor Palmer; for it is in reality not a book, but a wise man teaching, a great teacher reflecting, a subtle thinker setting forth his ideas. It is in its form, not so much instruction as consultation. The teacher is sitting at his desk with a group of young men about him, and reporting to them in the most intimate fashion his experience of life. "I have been moving about lately through the country," he begins; "When a plate of apples is passed and I pick out the best one," he goes on; "A stranger hands me a five dollar bill;" "A man I knew broke his leg" — how elementary and unsophisticated such teachings appear! One might even suspect that they were mere autobiography. The fact is, however, that the profoundest antinomies of conduct are approached through these trivial incidents, and that, in purporting to narrate the experience of the teacher, they in reality illustrate the most serious problems of ethics. The great guns of philosophical discussion are disguised by this ingenious camouflage of simplicity. It is not egotism which is using the personal pronoun, but dialectical skill. If education means the "e-ducing" or drawing out of a student's mind, few finer instances of the higher education could be cited than this ingenious familiarity with which Professor Palmer gently persuades consent. "When he putteth forth his sheep," it was said of the greatest of Teachers, "He goeth before, and the sheep follow him, for they know his voice."

This little book of eight lectures deals in this casual manner with the fundamental problem which confronts both individuals and nations today — the issue between egoism and altruism, individualism and socialism, the person and the community, the integrity of one's own character and the obligations of the life in common. This conflict of types, which has become the central theme of contemporary politics, as it has always been the chief perplexity of personal conduct, is summarily disposed of by Professor Palmer through his doctrine of the "Conjunct Self" — the essentially social nature of the individual, the unreality of the separate self, and the consequent merger of altruism with egoism. The successive stages through which this conjunctive principle develops are traced in successive chapters,

whose titles have the genuine Palmeresque touch of paradox and surprise. The teacher with dainty discrimination tries various words in succession to fit his theme, as a man of fashion might stand at the counter and select a necktie. One word is too vivid; another too dull; another does not match his thought. At last he settles on names which seem at first unsuggestive; but as he dresses his subject in them, they seem made for his discourse. "Manners," "Gifts," "Mutuality," "Love," "Justice" — such are the successive steps by which Egoism identifies itself with Altruism. "Manners" are simply the give and take of social life, the voluntary conformity to a conventional code; "Gifts" are the more substantial tribute of the person to the common life; "Mutuality" is the definite recognition of the "duality of giving;" "Love" is the flowering of mutuality into identity. "Perfect love knows no giving. What is there to give? All thine is mine, all mine is thine." Yet even Love is "selective mutuality," and beyond it lies that "public love which I have ventured to call Justice." "Justice knows no persons; or rather it knows everyone as a person and insures each his share in the common good." Justice is "the impartial love of our fellow-men." "In this external and superpersonal love, altruism attains its fullest and steadiest expression. But so does egoism too." "The conjunct self finds in this judicial love its large opportunity." "Socialism which does not promote individuality, individuality which does not tend toward a completer social consciousness, are alike delusive. Each must find its justification in the service it is able to render to its pretended foe."

Thus, with firm tread and gracious ease, Professor Palmer mounts the stairway of his argument. Each step is solid in itself, and each in turn prepares for the next. There is a sense of inevitability in the procedure. One could not step aside without intellectual disaster. The scholar takes the teacher's hand, and the way up becomes plain. Yet even more instructive than the ascent is the conversation on the way. Starting from a lifetime of acute observation and profound experience, the veteran teacher talks, as he mounts, of the limitations and insufficiency of each step. "One must not count 'Manners' too highly. It is as if I devoted a section to brushing the hair." There are defects in "Gifts." "It may be the part of wisdom to help only the strong, and let the weak sink." Even "Love" is "ever unstable." "Unrelated, it slips down into the lower forms of altruism." Cogent as are the formal arguments of the book, these passing reflections on the conduct of life may not improbably remain in the memory of many readers, as similar reflections remain in the

minds of many hearers of Professor Palmer's oral discourses, as the most convincing evidence of his sanity, discrimination, and poise.

There remains a further aspect of this little volume which is of more immediate significance. It is its relation to the movement of contemporary thought. The mind of the present time has been almost completely diverted from the ethics of personality to the ethics of social relationships. The Community, the State, the Labor Union, the Syndicate, the Revolution, have become the units of value. Professor Palmer, on the other hand, has represented to a whole generation of students the classical school of ethics, the analysis of motives, the classification of virtues and vices, the springs of action, the personal ideals. In the hall of Philosophy at Harvard University, Professor Palmer has delivered his famous lectures on the ground floor, while above him were collections illustrating social ethics, or the application of duty to the amelioration of modern life. There seemed to be here a division of fields. The student, having examined with Professor Palmer the nature of goodness, might mount to the second floor and study goodness at work. This apparent separation of being from doing, of character from service, is, however, quietly bridged by the doctrine of the "conjunct self." There is no separate self. One man is no man. Goodness is not achieved until it is socialized. Professor Palmer does not invade the foreign domain of social ethics, as though he marched upstairs in Emerson Hall and appropriated a larger lecture room; he simply indicates the obvious truth that to reach the second story one must enter on the ground floor. His teaching is at once a summary of moral philosophy and an introduction to social ethics. The classical method of analysis underlies the modern movement of reform. Perfect social service is practicable only through perfect moral freedom.

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PANTHEISM AND THE VALUE OF LIFE, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. W. S. URQUHART, M.A., D. PHIL. The Epworth Press, London. 1919. Pp. viii, 732. 12s. 6d.

This volume embodies a thesis approved by the University of Aberdeen for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, and appears to be in its entirety the developed form of a minor thesis adversely critical of Hindu pantheism, to which has been added the study of pantheism in the West, as represented by the Stoics, Spinoza, Hegel, and Schopenhauer; against which are urged the same objections as the author

has already made against the Vedanta. These objections are that, in contrast with a belief in a personal, good God, pantheism obscures moral values or denies them altogether and is universally pessimistic or tends to become pessimistic. Whatever is good in Stoicism, whatever is optimistic, is due to the fact that the Stoic was not really pantheistic; whatever is bad and pessimistic in Stoicism, is due to the fact that the Stoic was pantheistic. In other words, in Stoicism we are to see optimism and pessimism, good and bad, but also a theism as well as a pantheism, and we are to credit pantheism with all that is bad and leave the good to the credit of theism.

So with Spinoza, whose pantheism is universally admitted, but to whom, unfortunately, optimism (which ought not to be closely connected with pantheism) is also usually ascribed. Dr. Urquhart concedes that Spinoza is generally classed among optimists, and indeed points out the justification of this view. But he argues that Spinoza's optimism was based on too great confidence in knowledge as a means of salvation from evil. If Spinoza had lived today, he would have been less confident, therefore more pessimistic; hence we may say that his grounds for optimism are accidental, untrustworthy; so that we are justified in doubting whether he was really an optimist, since pessimism is the logical outcome of his teaching.

We submit that this argument is unsatisfactory. In details also, if space permitted, it would be of interest to debate some of the inductions made by the author to the glorification of theism versus pantheism. He implies throughout that love of God is impossible in pantheism, because this love is not personal affection between persisting realities, and conversely a theistic interpretation of the universe should result in the love of God. But it was Aristotle, no pantheist, who said that love of God was an insult to God; and surely no greater devotional love exists than is found in the pantheistic circles dominated by *bhakti*.

Here Dr. Urquhart would rejoin that *bhakti* implies polytheism (better a personal God and saviour); it is not a real adjunct of pantheism, but an emotional reaction. This brings us to the inner kernel of his work, the acute and scholarly criticism of Brahmanic pantheism. We may say at once that it is a real contribution to knowledge, in that it is a clarification, not so much of Hindu thought as of what has been said in respect of that thought. At the same time we question whether the author's synchronous attempt to clarify Hindu thought is legitimate. He would make a distinction, unimpeachable in logical necessity, between real pantheism and theistic pantheism, between real optimism and an optimism found in the Upanishads in

much the form it takes elsewhere: the world is all a fleeting show, but those who know God are released from vanity and sorrow. The Upanishadic restriction to the elect of those likely to enjoy ineffable bliss hereafter is also not unknown outside of pantheism. What we find to admire in Dr. Urquhart's work is far more than what we have to condemn, and it seems invidious to complain that a study of this sort, made by an expert in logical and philosophical discrimination, is too logical, too discriminating, to have its due effect. But such we believe to be the case. It is not till we get to the later systematized Vedanta that we have logic at all or any proper ratiocination. In the confused groping toward a spiritual unity, picturesquely voiced in the contradictory rhapsodies of the first pantheists, it is a mistake to apply a system of interpretation based on too lucid thinking. The Brahma or impersonal Power was forever shifting into the personal All-Soul, as this All-Soul was forever passing from an existence expressed by negations into God whose grace can save. Even the commentators on the Sutras were uncertain and confused, partly because they tried to be both logical and orthodox (that is, not heterodox in rejecting the traditional Word of God), and partly because pantheism in India has always felt divinity personally. When creation is predicated of a Lord of Beings who is represented as wishing ("He *desired*, let me be many") to create, how can we say with the author, "Creation means emission; it is not the definite exercise of conscious power"?

Again, when the ultimate state of the saved is described as that of a bliss too great to portray, when this bliss is said to be the very essence of Brahma, when the blessed, who even before death has a face shining with divine light and, released from all trouble and fear, "experiences bliss indescribable in words," is it not to be untrue to the Hindu scriptures to say that "this tranquil bliss" is unduly negative, and so to deny that pantheism can be optimistic, because the happiness attained is like the Absolute, only negative? Dr. Urquhart concludes that passive contentment without character enough to preserve the soul's personality is not "bliss in the true sense of the word." But it is not a question of what we think the Upanishad authors ought to have thought bliss to be. The bliss they looked forward to was as real to them as Dr. Urquhart's bliss to him, and they thought they were likely to attain it. The author says it was an impossible bliss. But surely the goal is real and obtainable to the Vedantist. The author argues that, energetic desire being excluded by the passive Vedantist and the ideal sought being such as to demand energy, "the goal is unattainable and the bliss

is out of reach." So "joy turns to bitterness and optimism to pessimism." But against this we may urge that the Hindus did not regard the bliss as unattainable, no matter whether they should logically have so considered it; hence the whole argument is vain; there is no conversion of optimism to pessimism to the Upanishad authors. We can still hear them singing hymns of joy that they, the elect few, are saved and about to enter into eternal bliss.

More satisfactory is Dr. Urquhart's discussion of the respective merits of Shankara and Ramanuja as interpreters of Badarayana. Here the author is at his best. He sides with neither as a partisan, but holds that Shankara is right as to the doctrine of illusion, not as interpreter of the earliest Upanishad thought but of the position necessitated in face of the philosophical difficulties; and that Ramanuja is right, as interpreting the Sutras, in claiming that the individual soul is real, but wrong here as interpreter of the Upanishads. The discussion of the Puranas is less satisfactory. These tracts represent merely the survival of original polytheism; pantheism has had little effect on this worship. The Hindus *en masse* are only nominally pantheists, users of taught phrases culled from superior minds; the many are, as they have always been, polytheistic. The hereafter that appeals to them is one of emotional fullness. A most valuable and searching criticism is the author's extended survey of the religious ideas of Vivekananda and Rabindranath Tagore, the latter justly scored as disguising his indebtedness to Western thought. Our own opinion is that Vivekananda was a good deal of a fakir, and Rabindranath is of no importance whatever; but those who enjoy his rather mushy religion will also welcome the opportunity presented by this estimate, very readable as well as fair, to see in what regard Rabindranath differs from the really Oriental, respectively Hindu, attitude toward life. The author might have made more of one point — that there has always been a healthy realization of life and its duties in the theistically shaded pantheism of India; it is a side of religion ignored by the effete talkers of present-day India but not by the virile Hindus of antiquity. The Bhagavad Gita does not praise a life of intellectual or physical indolence, but one of active endeavor; not pretty dreams but honest work in the world is a man's life, if he is to be fit to live hereafter with a God who says "I too work ever."

Dr. Urquhart has written a book which is not only a valuable contribution to the history of Indian thought but a quickening work, likely to rouse those for whom it raises the all-important question, Is your pantheism the best religion possible? Dr. Urquhart demon-

strates that in so far as pantheism is pessimistic it has a deadening effect, and reasonably advises all pantheists to take up a better, optimistic religion, which will put more life into the belief, more energy into the believer, and more happiness into the world. We agree fully that religion ought to make the whole world happier and that pantheism has not done much for the world at large. Only we question whether belief can be set aside for practical reasons, and whether the test of intellectual validity is to be found in the stimulus it exerts upon the believer's morale.

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THE RELIGIOUS TEACHING OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. ALBERT C. KNUDSON.
The Abingdon Press. 1918. Pp. 416. \$2.50.

Consideration of the influence which this book is likely to exercise in the great Methodist denomination makes one feel grateful that Professor Knudson has done such a careful and scholarly piece of work. Only fourteen years ago his predecessor, Professor Hinckley G. Mitchell, lost his chair in Boston University because he would not assert the historicity of the early chapters of Genesis. The Board of Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church regarded this as sufficient ground for refusing to confirm his reappointment to the chair of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis.

But a decade has wrought great changes. A sound, judicious progressiveness is apparently in the ascendant and this book is to be welcomed as one of its products. The author stands squarely upon the solid gains of modern biblical criticism in his presentation of the religious teaching of the Old Testament. This is quite evident in the excellent opening chapter, which gives an outline of the development of Old Testament religion and literature. One wonders, however, whether he has gained as much as he has lost by adopting the topical mode of discussion, even if he had in mind primarily the practical needs of the preacher. There are some aspects of Israel's religion that can be treated apart from the general history of the people. But others are deprived of a large measure of their human interest by dissociation from the historical movements in which they originated. It is difficult to see how the religious significance and consequences of the Deuteronomic movement can be presented under a topical treatment which focuses attention on certain abstract features of Israel's religion. But we must assume that the author accepted the disadvantages of this method to achieve certain ends which he had in view.

The author has grouped the contents of this book under two main headings: God and Angels, and Man and Redemption. Under the first he discusses in seven chapters the following aspects of the Old Testament conception of God: personality, unity, spirituality, power, holiness, righteousness, and love. The chapter on "Angels and Other Divine Beings" forms the eighth and concluding chapter of this part of the book, the last three pages being devoted to the development of the idea of Satan. The seven chapters of the second part deal successively with the following topics: the nature of man, the doctrine of sin, the problem of suffering, forgiveness and atonement, nationalism and individualism, the Messianic hope, and the future life.

In his introductory chapter Professor Knudson has forcefully pointed out that the ancients were little concerned with abstractions; that in order to interpret their religious ideas with historical justice one must remember that they dealt with the concrete and the tangible. One cannot help feeling that the author set himself a difficult task when he, therefore, begins to discuss, to the extent of about twenty pages each, the personality, unity, and spirituality of God. These aspects of the Old Testament conception of God obviously were rarely direct objects of Hebrew thought, but are a modern theological distillate from what they said or implied. Professor Knudson is far too good a scholar not to have been conscious of this difficulty, and one becomes genuinely interested in the skill with which he holds a middle course between these abstract topics and the historical reality.

In his broader conclusions the author, where two views are possible, leans to the conservative side. In the preface he declares it to be a contention of his book that the literary prophets were not the creators of ethical monotheism; that "the higher faith of Israel may be traced back into the pre-prophetic period," and that "its germ is to be found in the teaching of Moses." However, since he does not credit Moses (p. 79) with more than the establishment of monolatry, without denial of the existence of other gods, this germinal Mosaic monotheism had more to grow out of than to grow into before the time of Amos. If the decalogue is to be ascribed to Moses on the ground that "between the time of Moses and that of Amos there was no event and no personality significant enough to be regarded as the starting point of so far-reaching a change in the conception of the character of Yahweh," one wonders why he should think this period favorable for the development of ethical monotheism. It should be noted, *en passant*, that it is not strictly accurate to speak of a "unan-

imous biblical tradition ascribing the Decalogue to Moses." Professor Knudson, of course, means the ethical decalogue which was unknown to J, the oldest stratum of the Hebrew tradition. It should be mentioned also that to speak of the "calf-worship" of the Israelites without explaining that by golden calves were meant little bull-images used to represent the Baals as well as Jahveh, is misleading for the general reader. This indeed is one of the points at which the pre-Deuteronomic syncretism of Baal-Jahveh, which the author minimizes, comes to expression.

In the chapters that deal with the place of the individual in the religion of early Israel and with the history of the Messianic hope, Professor Knudson calls for a reconsideration and revision of views now generally held. He thinks it "a mistake to regard Jeremiah and Ezekiel as marking the beginning of individualism." He also holds that there was a more or less developed Messianic eschatology behind the preaching of the eighth-century prophets, and that the ethical idealism of the seers and singers of Israel sprang from their Messianic hope. "Their eschatology constituted the very atmosphere of their religious life." In this the reviewer cannot follow him. But to attempt a critical estimate of these and other positions taken by the author does not lie within the scope of this review. Professor Knudson has presented his evidence in carefully reasoned discussions which will interest serious-minded readers and richly deserve the attention of scholars. He is a man of learning and wide reading. He knows the literature of his subject, states the facts comprehensively, and has a keen eye for their practical bearings. His conclusions are set forth with admirable lucidity, and often with stimulating suggestiveness. In short, the book reflects honor upon the biblical scholarship of American Methodism, and we warmly commend it to the attention of all students of the Old Testament.

WILLIAM FREDERIC BADÉ.

PACIFIC SCHOOL OF RELIGION.

✓ ISRAEL'S SETTLEMENT IN CANAAN. C. F. BURNEY, D.LITT. Published for the British Academy, London, 1918. Pp. xi, 104. \$1.60.

With the march of archæological discovery the problem of the origins of Israel becomes an increasingly complex one. Dr. Burney does well therefore to make it the subject of his Schweich Lectures. The impulse came to him through investigation of the historical content of Judges in his recently published commentary on that book. From this vantage point he has surveyed the question in its various

aspects, and presents a view of the case which, though far from revolutionary, is both candid and judicious, learned and stimulating to thought.

In the first two chapters the Biblical tradition is carefully examined. Like all modern scholars, Dr. Burney concedes the superiority of the account given of Israel's settlement in Judges 1 1-12 5. But this also calls for closer criticism. A comparison of Judges 1 16 f. with Num. 21 1-3 and Judges 1 27 with such passages as Num. 32 39-42 and Judges 5 13-15 makes it clear that the movements of Judah, Simeon, and Manasseh there related were independent of any initiative from Joshua. The same inference applies to the other tribes who are represented as long maintaining a precarious foothold against the Canaanites. The only members of the later commonwealth of Israel, in fact, to whom the narrative ascribes any real share in the conquest under Joshua, are the Joseph tribes, settled in central Palestine. And, "if tradition is correct in making Joshua the successor of Moses in the leadership of Israel," it follows in all probability that the people whom Moses led out of Egypt at the Exodus was confined to the "household of Joseph," the remaining tribes belonging to "the floating semi-nomadic population, pressing in from the barren steppes to the northeast, which has always formed an element in the settled life of Canaan" (p. 36). This is certainly the conception we gather from the patriarchal legends of Genesis, where under the guise of eponymous heroes we find unveiled to us the wanderings and distribution of Israelite clans, "at a period possibly long prior to the entry of the Joseph tribes under Joshua" (p. 52). The elucidation of ancient legend is notoriously a field where the imagination is apt to run riot; but Dr. Burney displays a sanity of judgment, combined with a keenness of suggestion, which is worthy of all praise. We may note especially his emendation of Gen. 49 5 (pp. 38 ff.), his discussion of the early history of Levi (pp. 44 ff.), and his recognition of the astral character of the names of handmaid tribes, as contrasted with the totemistic background of a number of the purely Israelite stems (pp. 55 ff.).

In a closing lecture the external evidence is canvassed and resultant conclusions are drawn. Dr. Burney accepts the prevailing identification of the Tell el-Amarna *Habiru* and SA-GAS (ideogram for *habbatum*, "robber" or "cut-throat") with Hebrews "in the widest sense of the latter term." Scheil's discovery of *Habiru* mercenaries in the employment of the Elamite king Rîm-Sin, the contemporary of *Hammurabi*, is no insuperable objection to this theory, the Biblical tradition itself associating Abraham "the Hebrew"

with the same general period and locality. The Habiru are clearly Aramæan nomads who press continually westward, until in the reign of Ahnaton they occupy the whole of Palestine, from the Phœnician cities in the north to the district around Jerusalem. All this is in striking harmony with the movements of Hebrew tribes as reflected in the patriarchal traditions (pp. 82 ff.). That the main body of the Israelites had no part in the migration to Egypt is borne out by the mention of 'Asaru (the district assigned to the tribe of Asher) among the conquests of Sety I (c. 1313 B.C.), and the inclusion of Israel in the list of peoples subdued by Mineptah (c. 1222 B.C.). It is possible indeed that Israelite families may have participated in the southward movement of Amurru peoples under the Hyksos domination of Egypt, but the migration proper was confined to Joseph tribes, probably during the flourishing period of the Empire (from the reign of Thutmosi III onwards). On this view there is little reason to doubt that Ra'messe II was the Pharaoh of the oppression, and his successor Mineptah the Pharaoh of the Exodus. The contrasted theory of Mr. H. R. Hall, which connects the Exodus with the expulsion of the Hyksos, and identifies the Habiru aggressions with the conquest of Palestine by Joshua, not merely wrests the witness of the monuments, but "is obliged to do great violence to the Biblical tradition," for it crowds the campaigns of Sety, Ra'messe, and Mineptah into the period of the Judges, and otherwise alters the whole perspective of events (pp. 91 ff.).

ALEX. R. GORDON.

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ZOROASTRIANISM AND JUDAISM. GEORGE WILLIAM CARTER, PH.D. The Gorham Press. 1918. Pp. 116. \$2.00.

Judah Ibn Tibbon, one of the most famous translators from the Arabic into Hebrew during the Middle Ages, repeatedly emphasized the fact that to be a good translator one must possess these three qualifications: the mastery of the language from which he translates, the mastery of the language into which he translates, and the mastery of the subject-matter with which his translation deals. Slightly modified, one may apply this characterization to the author on comparative religion. To write intelligently on comparative religion one must master the systems of religion compared and their mutual relation.

The many points of resemblance between Zoroastrianism and Judaism have attracted the attention of the learned world for more

than two centuries. T. H. Hyde in his *Historia Religionis Veterum Persarum*, Oxford, 1700, had not the slightest doubt that Zoroastrianism was a poor copy of Judaism. Abraham is for him the first law-giver of the Persians, and the Messianic hopes found in the Zoroastrian writings are directly dependent upon the Old Testament, "which was well known to Zarathustra"—"quod ei bene notum fuit." One can hardly suppress a smile at his naïveté, but one must not take too seriously the opposite view, which maintains that Judaism borrowed its main religious views from Zoroastrianism.

The author of the present book, though he does not go to the extreme, is nevertheless convinced that "while the germs of the beliefs that came into prominence in post-exilic times in Judaism may be present in the earlier writings, the germs are not enough to explain the later developments." This reads like a compromise between those who deny any essential influence of Zoroastrianism on Judaism and those who make the latter depend on the former. Compromises may solve political and social difficulties, but never a scientific problem. If pre-exilic Judaism contained the germs from which its post-exilic form developed, then why make it dependent on external influences? But if post-exilic Judaism can only be explained as a result of foreign influences, it is no longer a direct development of the pre-exilic religion of Israel. However, be that as it may, the view of Eduard Meyer with regard to the relation of Zoroastrianism to Judaism is the only safe and sane one, at least for the present, while the date of composition of the most important Avesta documents is so uncertain.

The analogies between Judaism and Zoroastrianism, says Eduard Meyer,¹ are very striking, but it would be radically wrong to claim a direct influence of Zoroastrianism on Judaism. What is common to both religions is mainly due to their similar development, and, in some details, to the dependence of both on Babylonian religion. If we disregard Darmesteter's theories concerning the late origin of the Avesta, in which he finds elements borrowed not only from the Bible but also from Philo, the view of Eduard Meyer is shared by the leading authorities on the history of Judaism and Zoroastrianism. I will only mention Söderblom, whose book, *La Vie Future d'après le Mazdéisme* (Paris, 1901), is the most thorough and extensive study on the relation of Judaism to Zoroastrianism, and Schürer, whose *History* is the standard book on the inner life of the Jew at the time of the rise of Christianity. Both of them agree that the influence of Zoroastrianism on Judaism is of a very unessential nature. It is

¹ Die Entstehung des Judentums, p. 239.

therefore very regrettable that Dr. Carter did not follow the safe guidance of these scholars; for, carried away by untenable hypotheses, he gives to the public a very wrong impression of the development of later Judaism.

It would lead me too far to enter into a detailed discussion of this book, and there is no need of this, as there is hardly any material brought forward by the author which has not been thoroughly examined before by others. I shall, however, call attention to the following few facts. The author (p. 24) accepts as historical the tradition found in *Arda Virāf*, 1 2, according to which Zarathustra lived about three hundred years before the invasion of Alexander the Great — not before the time of Alexander, as the author has it. He maintains that this view is also in harmony with the most recent scholarship. But the testimony of Assyrian inscriptions finally disposes of this tradition. An inscription of the year 713 B.C. mentions the name "Miazdaka," and, as pointed out by Eduard Meyer, this shows that the Zoroastrian religion must even then have been predominant in Media. The author (p. 26) takes also as historical the legend about Zarathustra at the court of Vishtaspa. But the King Vishtaspa has no place in historical chronology. The legend undoubtedly thought of Hystaspes, the father of Darius I, and in true legendary style Hutaosa is given as the name of Vishtaspa's wife — a reminiscence of Atossa, the wife of Cambyses. The author shows a good deal of naïveté in his remark (p. 39) that post-exilic Judaism could not have been influenced by the Babylonians, because "the Babylonians were too gross in their idolatry to develop Jewish religious conceptions." One does not need to be an adherent of Pan-Babylonianism to see the absurdity of such a statement. That one who is not cognizant of the great influence which Babylonian religion has exercised upon Judaism does not take into account the contact between Aryan and Semito-Hittite religion, is of course not surprising. For our author, the seven archangels forming the heavenly hierarchy, according to later Jewish writings, are directly borrowed from Zoroastrianism (p. 65). But the truth is that the number seven has no special meaning with the Aryans, while it plays a very important part in the religious conception of the Babylonians. There can therefore be no reasonable doubt that the *seven Amesha Spenta* of Zoroastrianism, as well as the seven archangels of later Judaism, have their archetype either in the seven planets of the Babylonian cosmology or in the "ilâni-sibit of the Babylonians." This is no longer a hypothesis but an assured fact, as can be seen from the list of Assyrian gods published by Scheil (*R. T. r xiv*, 100), in which we

find Assara Mazdas (=Ahurah Mazdah) immediately followed by the seven spirits of heaven, the Igigi, and the seven spirits of earth, the Anunaki. That Asmodeus is not, as the author maintains (p. 65), of Persian origin, but is good Aramaic, I think to have conclusively shown in the Jewish Encyclopedia, s.u. *Asmodeus*. In this connection I may be permitted to call attention to my essay, *Mabbul Shel Esh*, published in the Hebrew periodical *Hag-Goren* (Bordetschan, 1912). In this essay I have shown that the conception of the conflagration of the world, which plays such an important part in the eschatology of Zoroastrianism and which is also known to the Jews and Greeks, is of Babylonian origin.

LOUIS GINZBERG.

THE JEWISH THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY OF AMERICA.

CHRISTIAN BELIEF IN GOD. A German Criticism of German Materialistic Philosophy. GEORG WOBBERMIN. Translated by DANIEL S. ROBINSON (Third German edition). Yale University Press. 1918. Pp. xx, 175. \$1.25.

This work has been well known and highly appreciated for several years by those who have read it in German. It is now made available to English readers in an excellent translation, and such readers will be well rewarded by its perusal. It is a brief book, in which the author sketches in large outline, and stresses the significant features of the Christian faith in its relation to the main currents of modern thought. He deals in the first chapter with the chief tendencies of present-day philosophy; in the second with epistemology; in the third with cosmology; in the fourth with biology; and in the final chapter with psychology. He shows the bearing of all these philosophical disciplines and their main conclusions on the Christian faith, and the place this faith holds in its own right as a living experience and as throwing light on the problems of philosophy. While the author recognizes the destructive criticism of Kant and the inadequacy of the old scholastic arguments for the existence of God, he holds, nevertheless, that there is need to show the implications of the modern world view, which requires the Christian faith for its best interpretation and justification.

The book is generous in its appreciations, particularly of the religious motive in Nietzsche; keen in its criticism, as in case of Haeckel; spiritual in its conception of the providence of God, as in his abandonment of the miraculous, and vitally religious.

DANIEL EVANS.

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE PROBABLE INFINITY OF NATURE AND LIFE. WILLIAM EMERSON RITTER, PH.D. The Gorham Press. 1918. Pp. 164. \$1.25.

I shall mention at the start two defects of this book, in order to have done with them early; for though prominent, they are not vital. The first is careless proof reading. Commas are occasionally out of place, and many words, including several proper names, are misspelled, the most unfortunate instance appearing in the dedication, where *Le Coute* is written for *Le Conte*. The second defect is a lack of sure-footedness in the field of physics, which the author, who is Director of the Scripps Institution for Biological Research, of the University of California, enters needlessly and where he often comes to grief. He spends about six pages in stating and refuting certain propositions of M. Gustave Le Bon, whom, I am confident, physicists would not generally accept as an expounder of their beliefs. He rejects the hypothesis of "the ether of space" on the curiously mistaken ground that physicists regard this ether as incapable of motion. He speaks rather scornfully of the "ultimate Atoms or Electrons of present-day physico-chemical metaphysics," partly because he objects to anything ultimate and partly because he opposes the idea of any possible divorce between electricity and matter. In neither of these criticisms of the electron belief is he, in my opinion, justified. The generation of physicists and chemists that has shattered, or at least splintered, the old-fashioned atom is not likely to make the mistake of supposing that the electron is essentially indivisible, however incapable we may be, at present, of dividing it experimentally. Moreover, the builders of the electron theory, instead of seeking to separate electricity and matter, are trying to explain matter by means of electricity; and surely one might expect that Professor Ritter, who will hear nothing of ultimates, would welcome this endeavor to explain ideas or phenomena heretofore regarded as final by others still more fundamental. That he does not do so is a curious fact which will be commented on later.

The following passage is significant: "Slight as was my training in these provinces [magnetism and electricity], and faded as are most of the facts and mathematical equations presented to me in my college days, very distinct pictures are still before my mind of sticks of sealing wax, chunks of amber, the skins of various small animals tanned with the hair on, pieces of flannel cloth, scraps of pith, bars of iron of various shapes and sizes, and so on, whenever the subject of magnetism was up for treatment." Now a man who thinks that "chunks of amber" and "scraps of pith" are the proper materials for illustrating magnetism may have perfectly sound ideas regard-

ing other matters of human knowledge, but he cannot parade such ignorance, while criticizing the beliefs of physicists, without discrediting to some extent his authority on matters with which he is more familiar.

But this, after all, is no great harm, for few of us expect authoritative answers to questions touching infinity; stimulating suggestion is all that we can reasonably look for, and this the book before us is capable of furnishing. It is well for us to have these questions represented occasionally, if only to be reminded that there is still mystery, even in the physical world, and probably always will be.

The author's main thesis, or a very important part of it, is presented in the passage which follows: "The conclusion pointed to is that the Cosmos or Universe or total order of things is genuinely infinite. By genuinely I mean infinite, not in the sense of subjectivist metaphysics or theology, but of physical science and mathematics. A short description or characterization of the Cosmos from this standpoint would be that it consists of an infinite number of bodies, each belonging to an infinite series, and that of all these bodies every one has some attributes in common with all the others but not one is exactly like any other." He seems to think, and perhaps he is right, that most people believe the material world to have existed in some form eternally. But he takes it for a fact that many who admit the past eternity of matter balk at accepting a past eternity of life, and he asks us to "reflect upon the relative difficulties in the conceptions that the oxide of iron, for instance, has existed forever, while organic beings must have begun, actually *de novo*, sometime, somewhere." He reminds us that "the great controversy of the Pasteur-Pouchet period, culminating in Tyndall's memoir of 1875, ended in the complete overthrow of the theory of spontaneous generation as then held," and he has no expectation whatever that Professor Jacques Loeb, for example, will ever succeed in producing life from materials which are not themselves the product and the seat of life.

Is Professor Ritter, then, a "Vitalist" in biology, as Professor Loeb is a "Mechanist." He refuses to go into either of these categories, neither of which, in his opinion, is satisfactorily defined. Undoubtedly he is a materialist, for he recognizes no properties or functions apart from matter. He rejects Louis Agassiz's "fallacy" of "attributing to Deity the power of *thinking sensible objects* into existence." He seeks to refute "Bergson's argument that the creativeness which is distinctive of the evolutionary process is wholly unique and requires the invocation of an impulsion from a source wholly beyond the realm of material things."

If we seek for one word additional to "materialist" for the characterization of Professor Ritter as a philosopher, we must call him an extreme pluralist. He rejoices in multitude, multitude of objects, multitude of substances, multitude of causes. The first quotation I have made from him must be taken literally as expressing his belief that no two of all the objects in the universe are exactly alike in their essential qualities. He holds that every individual animal or plant produces chemical substances the exact like of which were never produced and never will be produced by any other animal or plant. He does not make or welcome attempts to find fundamentals, few things explaining many. Hence, in part, his aversion to the conception of electrons. Herein, it seems to me, lies Professor Ritter's originality, and his contribution, such as it is, to philosophy. According to him, organisms, living bodies, tap sources of chemical energy which the processes of the laboratory cannot discover, and they do this by disintegrating the atoms of so-called elements, each act, each thought, each emotion, making use of some chemical reaction peculiar to itself; and, as no two individuals are precisely alike in their acts, thoughts, and emotions, no two individuals are the seats of precisely the same kinds of chemical reaction. Naturally, a chemical philosophy which begins by declaring itself outside the reach of present chemical tests can be neither confirmed nor refuted, though it may be rejected, by the chemists.

True to his love for multiplicity, the author closes his book with a chapter on Multiple Causes in Organic Evolution, from which the following characteristic passage is taken: "It is curious, once one comes to think of it, that Darwin and the rest of us should have talked so long and so absorbedly about one or a few 'factors' of evolution, when the demands of rigorous science are that there shall be at least as many causes as there are species. Were this not so, the same cause would produce different effects, and that would make biology a hocus-pocus indeed. Supernatural causes would be quite as amenable to science as such natural ones." And so he calls himself neither a Darwinian nor a Lamarckian, though he accepts natural selection as a real factor in evolution and, on the other hand, recognizes "a group of external causes producing 'body' changes, and a group of internal causes, no matter what their nature, producing after a while corresponding 'germinal' changes."

Professor Ritter says nothing, I believe, as to the bearing of his conception of the infinity of life in general on the question of the permanence of individual life, and as a thorough-going materialist he may not think this question worth considering. Yet one can

hardly avoid the following reflection: If the life of every individual should completely end, evidently an event much more readily imagined than the annihilation of all matter, all life would be extinct, and it could never come again. Thus we have the curious conception of life extending through a past eternity but coming to an end in the present or the finite future. I wonder whether Professor Ritter's philosophy would be satisfied with a terminated infinity. If not, is he, as an undoubting materialist, ready to accept that other weird conception, of a material essence of life, a ponderable soul, escaping from the body at death?

EDWIN H. HALL.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

ALCOHOL; ITS ACTION ON THE HUMAN ORGANISM. Report of the Central Board of the Liquor Traffic of England. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1918. Pp. xii, 183. 60 cents.

The adoption of constitutional prohibition by the United States will probably result in a more careful examination than ever before into the scientific foundations of our knowledge concerning the effects of alcoholic beverages taken in so-called small amounts. In comparatively recent years a number of surveys of the alcohol literature have been made. Frequently the authors of such summaries have revealed a partisan attitude in their choice of sources and in discussing "established results," so that perhaps no other scientific subject has suffered more from over-statement. Consequently it is important to understand something of the circumstances which prompted the preparation and publication of this book, and to note the personnel of the authors whose breadth of view is reflected in it.

By a prefatory announcement we are informed that in November, 1916, the British Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) appointed an Advisory Committee with instructions "to consider the conditions affecting the physiological action of alcohol, and more particularly the effects on health and industrial efficiency produced by the consumption of beverages of various alcoholic strengths, with special reference to the recent Orders of the Central Control Board, and further to plan out and direct such investigations as may appear desirable with a view to obtaining more exact data on this and cognate questions." The committee appointed comprised the following personnel: Lord D'Abernon (Chairman), Chairman of the Central Control Board; Sir George Newman, Principal Medical Officer of the Board of Education; A. R. Cushny, Pharmacologist; H. H.

Dale, Biochemist; M. Greenwood, Medical Statistician; W. McDougall, Psychologist; F. W. Mott, Pathologist; C. S. Sherrington, Physiologist; and W. C. Sullivan, Psychiatrist. A volume which these well-known scientific men have jointly produced merits very careful and wide attention. This is particularly true in the present instance because the members of the Committee are specialists in just those fields which would naturally fit them to judge and write intelligently about the action of alcohol on the human organism. The report is signed by all and the statement is made that "the conclusions represent the unanimous judgment of the committee."

The Central Control Board appointed the Advisory Committee because they considered the present "knowledge on the subject of the action of alcohol is inadequate to the needs and importance of the question;" so the Committee made it their first task to compile a summary statement of this present knowledge regarding alcohol. The above-titled book is their report on this subject. It is dated December, 1917; it was first issued as a British government publication, and is a commendable attempt to answer from experimental sources the question, "What is known concerning the action of alcohol on the human body?" No new results are contributed. The authors have made it their sole object to summarize and evaluate the facts which others have already gained by controlled observation and experimentation in this field. By this preliminary clarifying of the question it is their aim to prepare the way for further research.

The introductory chapter defines the principal scientific terms (many of them physiological) needful in discussing the subject, together with several familiar words, such as "food," "drug," "poison," and "alcohol." It discusses the constituents of alcoholic beverages, classifies the ordinary food substances, and briefly explains how the human body obtains energy from ingested food for tissue repair and for storage.

The known facts regarding alcohol effects are arranged under the following chapter topics: Alcohol as a food; Mental effects of alcohol; Alcohol and the performance of muscular acts; Action of alcohol on the digestion; Action of alcohol on the respiration and on the circulation of the blood; Influence of alcohol on the body temperature; Poison action of alcohol; Alcohol and longevity. A chapter on conclusions is followed by five pages of appendix, providing much very useful data on the consumption of alcoholic beverages, general mortality from alcoholism and also among males of the chief occupational groups, percentage of absolute alcohol in various beverages, and in ordinary retail quantities. Most of the appended data are statistics

from England and Wales. The usefulness of the book is greatly augmented by an adequate index.

Our purpose in this review is not to provide a digest of facts presented, but to introduce a book that is certain to make for clear thinking on a difficult topic. The book itself is a rather brief summary of complicated results. However, technical terms have been most successfully converted into popular language, the paragraphs are short, each chapter has many sub-heads, and no one will find the presentation difficult. Throughout the pages there is a fair number of references to original experimental reports from which the facts are drawn. Of the two thousand or perhaps more titles which might be cited in this literature, the authors have chosen about fifty, mostly from among the more recent contributions. It seems an oversight that mention is not made of the larger bibliographies on the question, even though these do not include the most recent references. Aside from its clearness and directness of statement the book is to be recommended for its impartiality in presenting the facts. Moreover, "the writers have frankly admitted doubt, when the evidence appeared insufficient to establish a definite conclusion, and have further indicated with absolute sincerity the many points, some of them of great importance, regarding which no precise and scientific knowledge is available."

The preface contributed by Lord D'Abernon is of particular interest to the scientific student of this problem. Here it is mentioned as a remarkable thing that, considering the world use of alcohol and its conceded importance to social, industrial, and economic life, humanity should lack exact knowledge of its action on the human system, for the writers contend that "no authoritative scientific work gives or seeks to give the required information." Lord D'Abernon kindly shows a little consideration for the investigators who have labored in this field by discussing some of the peculiar difficulties encountered in the laboratory when using alcohol with human subjects and when attempting to interpret the experimental results. He outlines a number of topics which the Committee regard as of fundamental importance for future investigation, and states that research, under their supervision, has already begun on several of these.¹

¹ Since this abstract was written, two valuable reports issued under the supervision of this committee have reached me, viz.: *Alcohol; its Absorption into and Disappearance from the Blood under Different Conditions*; and *The Influence of Alcohol on Manual Work and Neuro-muscular Coördination*. Special Report Series, Nos. 31 and 34, respectively, of the British Medical Research Committee.

Needless to say, the further activity of this Committee will be awaited with great interest, not only by the public but also by the other committees, commissions, and laboratories which have in progress organized work in this field. The problem is easily large enough to occupy profitably the attention of several such groups.

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